The Puppet Show

   Only one year ago, on January 12, 2011, a bloc of 11 ministers loyal to Hezbollah toppled Saad Hariri's government. These defections followed a dispute over the U.N.-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The STL was expected to implicate Hezbollah members in Hariri’s assassination, though Hezbollah denies any connection to the assassination. Two weeks after unseating the government, Najib Mikati was approved to premiership by 68 parliament members, a majority of Hezbollah and its March 8 allies.

   

   The March 8 coalition’s backing of Mikati created the perception of him as "Hassan Nasrallah's Marionette" or "Hezbollah's Puppet" in the Lebanese and international media. However, Mikati has proven his independence from those backers several times until he completely disobeyed Nasrallah on the STL issue. What made Mikati cast off the puppet strings?

   

   Firstly, it is important to understand why Nasrallah chose Mikati as his candidate for the premiership. Mikati is an educated Sunni Muslim, who made his fortune in telecommunications. Nasrallah, by contrast, is a radical Shiite leader, who dedicated his life to the destruction of Israel and the welfare of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. Mikati served as Prime Minister for three months in 2005 (following the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami), but Nasrallah has never been directly involved in politics and always prefers to be behind scenes.

   

   The alleged connection between the two is unclear and that is precisely what is so brilliant about Nasrallah's choice. Mikati is considered to be moderate, but expressed a pro-Syrian standpoint and has expressed support for the resistance in the disarmament and STL conflicts.

   

   Thus, when the consultations to form the new government began, Mikati was optimistic and said he insists on forming a government that satisfies all Lebanese citizens. However, the gaps between Nasrallah's demands and the March 14 alliance were too wide, particularly regarding the STL issue. The latter alliance urged him to uphold the STL in the face of calls by Hezbollah and its allies to sever ties with the tribunal. The March 14 bloc also sought Mikati’s public commitment not to disavow the STL, while Hezbollah demanded just the opposite. Mikati refused to make a commitment to any party, stressing that conflicting demands by the rival factions could be solved through dialogue.

   Nonetheless, since May 2011 Nasrallah has implied to the media that American pressure and not internal disagreement is what obstructs Mikati’s government formation. Obviously, the Hezbollah leader was not satisfied with the delayed process and needs to clarify that he is the operator and Mikati the Puppet.

  

   Mikati's response was to emphasize that “the fact that Hezbollah and its allies have 18 seats in the 30-member Cabinet does not mean that the country will join the radical camp in terms of its relations with the international community,” as he announced in the press conference about his government lineup.

   

   In addition, Mikati stressed the significance of more than one-third of the Cabinet ministers having been appointed by himself, the President, and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt, to ensure Hezbollah and its allies could not control the government. This announcement calms international community and addresses the opposition's concerns. It makes Nasrallah look like he is no longer the puppet operator, and paints Mikati as the one in charge.

   

   The main conflict was, and still is, the STL. For a few months Mikati followed Nasrallah's orders by refusing to pay Lebanon's share of funding the STL and by not arresting Hezbollah members accused of involvement in the assassination. However, Mikati agreed in November 2011 to pay Lebanon's share ($36 Million). He did satisfy Nasrallah by saying that Lebanon cannot find the suspects. Nevertheless, agreeing to pay is a severe violation of Nasrallah's trust.

  

   It seems that taking office was the turning point in Mikati's status as a puppet, when realized he cannot renounce his predecessor’s international obligations. Surprisingly, Nasrallah did not react fiercely, and the question remains why. 

  

   Perhaps what most concerns Nasrallah is the future fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the severe economic sanctions on Iran. The latter could harm the major funding Hezbollah receives from Iran.

   

   Only a year ago it looked like Nasrallah could not lose and that his years-long patience had paid off. But the euphoria lasted only a few months – the Syrian spring started, the economic sanctions on Iran became most stringent, and Mikati’s rebelliousness deteriorated. Nasrallah has to find a way to regain control of the Puppet Show, and a war against Israel is not an unlikely possibility. Can a war against Israel be used as an effective solution to his domestic problems as it was in the past? We have to wait and see.  


Data provided by publications in the Lebanese press.

If Assad Falls – The Lebanese Arena

    “Lebanon will begin a process of state building following the collapse of President Bashar Assad’s government.”                                (Samir Geagea, Lebanese Forces leader, to his party members, 1/1/2012).

   Geagea is not alone in hoping that Lebanon’s political reality will change after Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses. Assad’s fall would have an immense impact on Lebanon even though Syria is no longer considered Hezbollah’s patron-state. Today, Syria is merely a strategic partner of Hezbollah and a channel of transferring weapons from Iran to Lebanon.

   The March 14 bloc dreams of a Lebanon free from Syrian intrusion, with an intact political system. They envision a pro-Western state with no personal or sectarian intrigues. Can this dream come true after Assad’s fall? Sadly, it is probably the only unattainable scenario. Since the 1940’s, long before the Syrians entered Lebanon, the Lebanese political balance of power has been based on the different sects. The Taif Accord of 1989 perpetuated and institutionalized this practice by establishing sectarian requirements for major government positions, i.e. the President must be a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House is a Shi’a Muslim.

   The March 8 bloc, headed by the Loyalty to the Resistance party (Hezbollah), aims for a different outcome. Edan Landau from Israel Defense argues that Hezbollah might use their influence in the Shiite majority in order to change the constitution. This possibility should not be ignored. However, it must be noted that in the past Hezbollah has chosen not to change the constitution, despite there being a Shiite majority in Lebanon (41%) for many years.

   In light of the changing Sunni Middle East, there seem to be three possible scenarios to consider for a post-Assad Lebanon. The first scenario is the continuance of the current balance of terror - the on-going Hezbollahzation of Lebanon. During the last two decades Lebanese leaders have adjusted to the fact that Hezbollah is the sole Lebanese armed militia, as it and not the LAF was appointed the protector of the Southern border by the Taif Accord.

   Just as Lebanon had its Hezbollahzation process, Hezbollah has gone through a Lebanonization process. Since Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary-General, the Lebanese-Shiite side of the organization has been strongly emphasized. The idea of creating an Islamic State became a utopian ideal of the group while more practical matters dominated the party platform. The Shiite community needed a political and social representation, and hence, in almost every speech, Nasrallah includes the idea of the unity of the Resistance and Lebanon.

   This scenario is very reasonable. It means that Hezbollah remains behind the political scenes and raises its head every now and then to maintain its interests in the government and Lebanon.

   The second scenario is a violent take-over of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah controls the government as it has major influence over Prime Minister Mikati. In the past, Hezbollah had utilized violent means in order to pursue political goals, such as a veto power in the government (2008). It is not unlikely that the organization would use this strategy again to ensure its political position and power.

   In this case, Hezbollah would take the reins (commit a coup) and appoint its own government with no democratic elections. The consequences of such a coup are countless. Apart from benefiting from governing Lebanon according to its needs, Hezbollah would have to face a new reality as a State-Actor. It would have to fulfill international obligations of previous governments (e.g. the Special Tribunal for Hariri’s Assassination). Moreover, as a State-Actor, the organization could expose itself to international economic sanctions. Today, Hezbollah cannot afford to be exposed to such sanctions, especially when its patron state, Iran, is under the same sanctions itself.

   The third scenario is the worst – the return of the civil war. This is a situation that all parties tried to avoid the last two decades. A civil war would have severe implications: a formation of an emergency government, in which no party can guarantee its control. In addition, the international community might consider military intervention, like in the 1980’s.

   Nonetheless, it is important to remember that an international military intervention is not a trivial undertaking, as we can see from the current discussions about intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the only armed militia in Lebanon today is Hezbollah. Unlike in the 1980’s, no other sect, group or party has an organized armed militia. In this scenario, other sects would have to protect themselves and would form new armed militias to fight Hezbollah.

   No one can predict what would happen in Lebanon the day after Assad’s fall. We can only hope for a better future and a full cooperation with the new Syrian regime.

Sources:

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jan-01/158502-geagea-lebanon-to-begin-state-building-after-assads-fall.ashx#axzz1iCQ8sfQn

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=514&ArticleID=743

Lebanese Army vs. Hezbollah – Who Wins?

   During his visit to Washington last week (December 8, 2011), Lebanese Finance Minister Mohammad Safadi raised a sensitive issue: American aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to Safadi, "Hezbollah’s role as an armed resistance in defending Lebanon would become moot if the country’s army was fully equipped and capable." Safadi also said that Hezbollah has no hold over the current Lebanese government. When approaching the discussion over allocation of aid to the LAF, members of the House committee will need to consider whether this support would indeed undermine Hezbollah’s position and make LAF the sole defender of Lebanon's security.

   First and foremost, it is essential to understand Lebanon’s importance in the international community. Indeed, it has no natural resources like many African countries, nor consumer power like China or India. Its importance resides with its symbolic clash between the Soviet bloc and the West in the past and the Islam and the West these days. Each side considers Lebanon as an “easy to influence” country due to its “failed” status and its political-sectarian system, based on personal and sectarian interests rather than national ones.

   American aid to Lebanon was initiated in 1946, when Lebanon became an independent state. In 1958 President Eisenhower sent 14,000 troops to support the first free elections, and to assure Lebanon's support for the pro-Western bloc. President Reagan sent troops to Lebanon in 1981 (six years after the civil war had started) as a part of an international peace-keeping force. They faced Palestinian terrorist organizations, AMAL (secular Shi'a terrorist organization), and beginning in 1982 – Hezbollah. In 1984, after suffering painful terrorist attacks with massive casualties, the U.S. withdrew from Lebanon and concentrated its efforts in mediating and financial and military aid.

   Up until 2005 the U.S. provided around $300 million annually in financial and military aid to Lebanon, including the training of LAF officers (over 3,000 officers were trained over the years in military academies in the U.S.). In 2005 the budget was decreased to $100 million and increased after the 2006 war, based on the thinking that assisting LAF would improve its position with respect to Hezbollah. The budget was frozen last August after the establishment of the new Lebanese government which included a Hezbollah majority. This is the budget Safadi is now asking to revive.

   We should be careful not to belittle Safadi's claims, but the truth has many faces, particularly in Lebanon. Since 2005, when participating for the first time in the government, Hezbollah caused multiple constitutional crises, occasionally involving political violence (2005, 2008). Hezbollah also holds sole responsibility for the constitutional crisis in January 2011, which lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the appointment of Najib Mikati. Each crisis resulted from Hezbollah's dissatisfaction with various governmental policies. Each crisis ended in a compromise favouring Hezbollah's interests above the national interest of Lebanon.

   This forgiveness and lenience towards Hezbollah is well rooted in Lebanese politics, and its origins lie in the constant fear of a return to civil war. Nasrallah, they believe, can "start a fire" at any given moment; this risk must be eradicated, at any price, even if it means surrendering to Hezbollah's demands.

   A few years ago Nasrallah stated that the army [LAF] defends the resistance [Hezbollah] and that the resistance is honored to be protected by the army. This saying has firm grounding, as Hezbollah's status as a "resistance organization" is clearly recognized in the Taif Accord (October 22, 1989) which ended the civil war. The Taif Accord included, amongst other things, the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, with the exception of Hezbollah. The reasoning behind this arrangement was that the LAF cannot oppose Israel in the South unaided, whereas Hezbollah, with its massive Iranian funding, can.

   At the end of the day, the objective of the two organizations is largely the same – defending Lebanon from external enemies, namely, Israel. It is very possible that in the next war with Israel, the LAF and Hezbollah will co-operate.

   As the situation in Lebanon currently stands, even a well equipped army cannot resist Hezbollah. The balance of power between Hezbollah and LAF, is not a military balance of power, but a political one, and it cannot be changed by additional financial aid to LAF. This should be the main consideration of the House Committee when deciding whether to revive military and financial aid to LAF. Hezbollah holds the majority of the cards in Lebanon today; even if from time to time is seems otherwise.

Data provided by CRS reports and publications in the Lebanese press; http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Dec-08/156320-safadi-to-us-arming-military-decreases-hezbollahs-role.ashx#axzz1g241h6cF

Nasrallah's Assassination - Yes or No?

   It is often asked: “Why does Israel not take the initiative and assassinate Nasrallah in order to destroy Hezbollah?” A common theory is that when the "head of the snake" has been taking off, the body will cease to exist. However, this is not the case. In order to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, one must adopt the assumption that assassination is a legitimate tool in asymmetric warfare. The moral issue (the fear of hurting innocent people) and the legal issue (execution without a fair trial) must be set aside in this analysis.

   The efficacy of an assassination has to be examined in light of the state actor’s interest. Effectiveness can be measured by several levels, such as the structure of the terrorist organization (hierarchical, networks etc.); possible successors, their character and agenda; the organization's response to the assassination, and the international community's response. In the last two decades a few leaders of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations were assassinated by states, and it seems like most of these operations did not achieved their intended purpose.

   Abbas Mussawi, second Secretary-General of Hezbollah (successor of Subhi al-Tufeyli, who was in duty from 1989 and was replaced due to his objection to Hezbollah's participation in national elections), who was one of the founders of the organization, was assassinated by Israel on February 16, 1992.

   The assassination was carried out in public, with combat helicopters shooting missiles at Mussawi’s convoy, killing him, his wife, son and four others. Hezbollah's retaliation was harsh – mega-terrorist attacks in the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community center in Argentina the same year. It is hard to believe that Israel would approve a public assassination if they were taking under consideration the retaliation or the identity of future successor, who might mark a bigger and more painful impact in the region.

   Since its founding, Hezbollah has been a hierarchical organization, with the Secretary-General at the top of the pyramid. The Secretary-General also leads the Decision-Making Shura Council (Religious clerks and Hezbollah's senior activists), and has a deputy. During the years Hezbollah has adapted and changed according to changing reality, needs and circumstances in the area. The biggest change occurred after 2006, when Hezbollah concentrated most of its wings under the Jihad Council and the direct control of Nasrallah.

   Israel tried this tactic again on February 12, 2008, with the assassination of Imad Mughniyah, military commander of Hezbollah. The assassination did not lead to Hezbollah's annihilation, and in contrast to Mussawi’s assassination did not cause a harsh retaliation. It has a few possible reasons. First, Hezbollah was occupied with its own issues in the Lebanese political arena. Second, the organization was still recovering from the damages of the war. Finally, an assassination of a military commander is a part of the game, unlike a political leader, and therefore its retaliation is "softer."

   Another example for an assassination that did not achieve its objective is the assassination in Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's leader and founder, on March 22, 2004. Yassin was released from Israeli prison in 1997. He was assassinated on his way to a morning prayer, along with two bodyguards. Yassin was eliminated as a threat but Hamas kept growing with massive terrorist attacks within Israel and took over Gaza by winning the democratic elections in 2006.

   The assassination of Osama Bin Laden by the Americans is exceptional in many ways. With his assassination, the U.S. wished to undermine Al-Qaeda, by removing its most significant symbol. This assassination achieved only partial success. Ayman al-Zawahiri replaced Bin Laden as the leader, and lives underground. Al-Zawahiri does not have the same charismatic personality as Bin Laden and his influence on the affiliated groups is minor. One must recall that the organization is built as a network of nodes and hubs, without a clear chain of command.

   Al-Qaeda has lost a part of its attraction. Its funding monies are not as plentiful as before, but the organization itself has changed. As for the organization's retaliation, apart from threats and minor attacks in the Middle East, no attack has been executed in Western countries up to date. And, still, Al-Qaeda exists and is apparently here to stay.

   These examples demonstrate the ineffectiveness of assassination as a means to destroy terrorist organizations, especially in the case of Hezbollah. Uncertainty appears in every consideration of analysis. Since Hezbollah is a hierarchical organization, Nasrallah will have a successor, whether Naim Qassem, Nasrallah's deputy, or the military commander, whose name is confidential. Will the future successor continue Nasrallah's legacy or might have more radical approach, in order to exceed his former?

   The regional reality is an additional factor. Syria is under the threat of a revolution and Iran is still trying to preserve its nuclear program, and hence their financial and strategic support is undependable. Nasrallah's successor would have to face a new and different reality, including using alternative funding resources to Iran, and no Syrian support. It is not inevitable that facing this reality would force him to develop a survival policy, i.e. returning to the 1980's terrorist attacks, in addition to activate the sleeping cells in North and South America, Asia and Africa.

   Another problem is the Lebanese domestic arena. Current Prime Minister Najib Mikati was designated under the influence of Nasrallah, and seemed to be a puppet until recently (when he agreed to pay Lebanon's part of the STL expenses, worth $34 Million). Mikati's loyalty to Nasrallah’s successor would be questionable and have a significant influence on Hezbollah's dominant position in Lebanon. An inferior position, after many years of establishing their control in Lebanon, might bring the organization into a defensive position, forcing it to execute a coup and strike fiercely against Israel.

לחסל או לא לחסל?

   פעמים רבות נשאלת השאלה מדוע ישראל אינה נוטלת את היוזמה לידיה ומחסלת את נסראללה, כאמצעי להשמדת חיזבאללה. מקובל לחשוב כי כאשר יחסלו את "ראש הנחש", הגוף (ארגון הטרור) יפסיק להתקיים, אך לא כך הדבר. על מנת לענות על שאלה זו יש להניח בצד את השיקול המוסרי (חשש לפגיעה בחפים מפשע) והחוקי (תהליך של הוצאה להורג ללא משפט הוגן), ולצאת מנקודת הנחה כי התנקשות היא כלי לגיטימי במלחמה א-סימטרית, בין ארגון למדינה.

   

   יש לבחון את יעילות כלי ההתנקשות ביחס למטרה אותה מעוניינת המדינה להשיג. יעילותו יכולה להימדד במספר מישורים, כגון מבנה הארגון (היררכי, מבוזר, רשתי וכו'), המחליפים האפשריים למנהיג המועמד לחיסול, אופיים והאג'נדה בה הם מחזיקים, תגובת הארגון לחיסול ותגובת הקהילה הבינלאומית לחיסול. בשני העשורים האחרונים חוסלו מספר מנהיגי ארגוני טרור במזה"ת על ידי מדינות, ונראה כי רובם לא השיגו את המטרה שלשמה הוצאו לפועל.

    

   עבאס מוסאווי, המזכ"ל השני של חיזבאללה (החליף ב- 1991 את סובחי אל-טופיילי, שכיהן בתפקיד מאז 1989 והודח מתפקידו משום שהתנגד להשתתפות חיזבאללה בבחירות הארציות), שהיה אחד מעמודי התווך של הארגון מאז ייסודו ב- 1982, חוסל על ידי ישראל ב- 16 בפברואר 1992. החיסול נעשה במופגן, בירי טילים ממסוקים על שיירת רכבים בה נסע. בפעולת החיסול נהרגו גם אשתו, בנו וארבעה נוספים. תגובתו של חיזבאללה לא איחרה לבוא, ועוד באותה השנה ביצע פיגוע גדול-מימדים בשגרירות ישראל ובמרכז הקהילה היהודית בארגנטינה. קשה להאמין כי בישראל היו מאשרים חיסול פומבי כזה אם היו לוקחים בחשבון את התגובה הקשה, או, לחילופין, מיהו מחליפו העתידי, אשר עתיד להטביע חותם גדול וכואב יותר על האזור.

   

   מתחילתו היה חיזבאללה ארגון היררכי, כאשר בראשו עומד המזכיר הכללי. המזכ"ל עומד גם בראש מועצת השורא המייעצת (מועצת חכמי דת שיעים ובכירי הארגון), ומתחתיו סגנו. במשך השנים חיזבאללה התפתח והשתנה על פי הצרכים, הנסיבות והמציאות באזור. השינוי הגדול ביותר התרחש לאחר מלחמת לבנון השנייה ב- 2006, אז חיזבאללה ריכז את רוב אגפיו תחת מועצת הג'יהאד, בפיקודו הישיר של חסן נסראללה, מחליפו של מוסאווי.

   

   ישראל ניסתה את מזלה שנית ב- 12 בפברואר 2008, אז חיסלה את עימאד מורנייה, המפקד הצבאי של חיזבאללה. גם חיסול זה לא הוביל להפסקת פעילות חיזבאללה, אך גם לא גרם לתגובה קשה כמו זו שלאחר חיסול מוסאווי. לאי-התגובה מספר סיבות אפשריות. ראשית, חיזבאללה היה טרוד בבעיותיו הפוליטיות-פנימיות בלבנון. שנית, הארגון עדיין היה בתהליך "החלמה" מהנזקים שנגרמו לו במלחמת לבנון השנייה. לבסוף, התנקשות במנהיג צבאי נתפסת בדרך כלל כחלק מכללי המשחק, בניגוד לחיסול מנהיג פוליטי, ולכן התגובה לו היא "רכה" יותר.

   

   דוגמה אחרת לחיסול שלא השיג את מטרתו היא חיסולו של השייח' אחמד יאסין, מייסד ומנהיג תנועת חמאס, ב- 22 במרץ 2004. יאסין שוחרר מהכלא הישראלי בשנת 1997, והתחייב שלא לעודד או לעסוק בפעולות טרור, התחייבות שלא עמד בה. יאסין חוסל בירי טילים בדרכו לתפילת הבוקר, יחד עם שני שומרי ראשו. יאסין חוסל, אך חמאס המשיך ועודנו מבצע פיגועים בשטחי ישראל ואף השתלט על רצועת עזה ב- 2006, בבחירות שאיש לא חזה את הצלחתו בהן.  

   לעומת זאת, חיסולו של אוסמה בין לאדן בידי האמריקאים הוא יוצא דופן מכמה סיבות. בחיסולו של בין לאדן קיוו האמריקאים להשיג את מפלתו של אל קאעידה, אשר נותר ללא סמלו המובהק ביותר. החיסול השיג את מטרתו באופן חלקי. את מקומו של בין לאדן תפס איימן א-זאווהירי, אשר כיום חי במחתרת. א-זאווהירי אינו נתפס כמנהיג כריזמטי כקודמו, ונראה כי השפעתו על ארגוני המשנה קטנה יותר. יש לזכור כי הארגון אינו היררכי וקיימות פזורות שלו בכל רחבי העולם, ללא שרשרת פיקוד ברורה, כמו גם תאי טרור קטנים אשר פועלים בשם אל-קאעידה, אך אינם שייכים אליו רשמית.

   

   אל-קאעידה איבד חלק ממשיכתו, וכספי המימון אינם רבים כבעבר, אך גם הארגון עצמו אינו כשהיה. באשר לתגובת הארגון, מלבד איומים ופיגועים קטנים ולא משמעותיים במזרח התיכון, לא בוצע עד היום פיגוע בקנה מידה גדול במערב, כפי שחיזבאללה ביצע בתגובה לחיסול מוסאווי. תגובת הקהילה הבינלאומית הייתה אף היא ברובה אוהדת, מלבד איראן, סוריה וחיזבאללה. ועדיין, אל קאעידה עודנו קיים וסופו אינו נראה באופק.

   

   דוגמאות אלו ממחישות את אי יעילותו של כלי ההתנקשות במנהיגי ארגון טרור, ובעיקר במנהיג של ארגון כחיזבאללה, ואי הודאות זרועה בכל שיקול. מתוקף ההיררכיה, לנסראללה יימצא תחליף, אם בדמות שייח' נעים קאסם, סגנו, או בדמות מפקד הזרוע הצבאית, ששמו חסוי כיום. האם מחליפו העתידי ימשיך באותו קו שהתווה נסראללה, או שמה יבחר בדרך קיצונית יותר, על מנת להתעלות על קודמו?

   

   המציאות האזורית כיום היא שיקול נוסף. סוריה נמצאת תחת איום הפלת השלטון ואיראן עודנה מנסה לשמור על תכנית הגרעין שלה, ולפיכך תמיכתן, הכספית והאסטרטגית, אינה מובטחת כפי שהייתה בעבר. מחליפו של נסראללה לאחר ההתנקשות ייאלץ לעמוד בפני מציאות חדשה, בה ייעשה שימוש במקורות מימון חילופיים לאיראן וללא תמיכה סורית. אפשר שמציאות זו תיאלץ אותו לנקוט במדיניות של הישרדות, קרי חזרה לפעולות הטרור של שנות ה-80, בנוסף להפעלת תאי הטרור, הרדומים והלא-רדומים, בצפון ודרום אמריקה, אסיה ואפריקה.

   גם בזירה הפנימית-לבנונית תיווצר בעיה באם נסראללה יחוסל. ראש הממשלה הנוכחי, נג'יב מיקאתי, מונה לתפקידו תחת השפעתו הרבה של נסראללה, ונראה כי היה כפוף להנחיותיו עד לאחרונה (כאשר הסכים למלא אחר התחייבותה של הממשלה הקודמת לשלם חלק מהוצאות הטריבונל לחקירת רצח חרירי, כ- 34 מיליון דולר). נאמנותו למנהיג אחר מוטלת בספק, ולכך תהיה השפעה לא מבוטלת על מעמדו הדומיננטי של חיזבאללה בלבנון. עמדה נחותה בפוליטיקה הלבנונית, לאחר כל מאמצי הארגון לשלוט בלבנון מאחורי ולפני הקלעים, יכולה להביא את הארגון לעמדת התגוננות, לביצוע הפיכה, ולפעול ביתר עוצמה כנגד ישראל.

Out of the Bunker

   Hassan Nasrallah’s appearance yesterday morning (December 6, 2011) is a rare occasion. Since the 2^nd Lebanon War (July War) in 2006, Nasrallah is cautious and spend most of his days in a secret bunker. His last public appearance was in 2008, when the Lebanese terrorist Samir Kuntar was released from Israeli prison in exchange of the bodies of two Israeli soldiers.

   
   Nonetheless, Nasrallah’s step is not surprising. In the last few months, since the Syrian uprising started, Hezbollah has been moving its weapons arsenals from Syria to Lebanon, and the organization warriors, who assisted Assad at first, do not have the same supporting presence anymore.

   
   Syria is nothing more than a strategic partner for Hezbollah. It is not a funding source or religious inspiration, but mainly a crossing point between Iran and Lebanon, as well as a supporter in the international arena. The strategic partnership was more significant until spring 2005, when the Syrians withdrew from Lebanon after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri– assassination of which after all pointed at the Syrian regime and Hezbollah as responsible.

   
   Iran is a different story. Iran is the main source of funding to Hezbollah since its establishment in 1982. It is the one to fund the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in the 1980’s, and Israel. Its security forces were responsible for training Hezbollah’s warriors and to fund purchasing weapons. Iran is the one to fund schools, orphanages and hospitals in Shi’a areas. It is the one to religiously inspire the Shi’a community in Lebanon in general and Hezbollah particularly.

   
   In light of recent events in Syria and Iran, when it seems that Bashar Assad’s days as a ruler are numbered, and Iran is concentrating all its efforts in preserving the nuclear program and thrusting the West criticism, Hezbollah was left out. The long-term program, so typical to Nasrallah, did not include the halt of the Iranian funding nor Assad’s falling, even though the last in not as meaningful as Iran’s funding.

   
   Nasrallah’s appearance symbolizes the “day after” preparations - the day after Assad, the day after weak and un-functioning Iran. Exactly for this purpose Hezbollah has developed through the last two decades additional funding sources, such as drug trafficking in South America, blood diamonds and weapons trade in West Africa and smugglings in North America. Another funding source is the charitable organizations throughout the world that are used for funding Hezbollah’s social institutions in Lebanon, as well as its terrorist activities. Moreover, Iran has granted Hezbollah the control over many Iranian charitable organizations as a gesture of trust in 2008.

   
   In recent speeches, Nasrallah stated that any attack on Syria or Iran might lead to an all-inclusive war in the Middle East. These statements cannot be ignored – they are binding Nasrallah in front of the Arab World, and he will not hesitate to execute them, even if in a smaller scale than promised. Nevertheless, Nasrallah is obligated first and foremost to Hezbollah’s internal position (i.e. Lebanon) and to keeping the unstable status-quo of the Lebanese political system. This obligation is more important for him today than its engagement with Iran and Syria.

   
   His statements against the U.S. and Israel are no more than a failed attempt to deceive his audience and decrease the importance of the events in Iran and Syria.  He tries to turn his listeners’ attention to the natural enemies of the Arab world - the main cause for any wrongful event in the region. His statements are also aimed to prepare the ground for a future international intervention in the area, as Nasrallah tries to prevent a possible support of the Lebanese and Arab world in his habitual enemies.


   Nasrallah is obligated to show his strength. By this public appearance, even for these few minutes, he emphasizes the enormous importance that he and his organization attribute to the relations with the Arab public and the Lebanese Shiite community in particular. In his appearance he proves that despite the massive international and Arab criticism on Iran and Syria, Hezbollah remains at the same position of "owning" Lebanon and it cannot be replaced. Therefore, Hezbollah will continue to be a key player in any regional process, whether positive or negative.

נסראללה מחוץ לבונקר?

הופעתו בציבור של חסן נסראללה, מזכ"ל חיזבאללה, אתמול בבוקר (6.12.2011) היא אכן צעד נדיר.

מאז סיום מלחמת לבנון השנייה נסראללה מודד את צעדיו ומבלה את רוב הזמן בבונקר סודי, כאשר מאז 2008 לא יצא ממנו, ודאי שלא להופעות בציבור.

   עם זאת, צעד זה אינו מפתיע. בחודשים האחרונים, מאז התחילו ההפגנות בסוריה, חיזבאללה החל להעביר את מצבורי הנשק שלו מסוריה ללבנון, ואנשי הארגון, שבתחילה סייעו לאסד בדיכוי ההפגנות, לא מפגינים את אותה רמת הנוכחות שהפגינו בתחילה.

   סוריה אינה יותר מאשר שותף אסטרטגי לחיזבאללה. היא אינה משמשת כמקור מימון או השראה דתית, אלא בעיקר כנקודת מעבר בין איראן ללבנון, כמו גם כתף תומכת בזירה הבינלאומית. השותפות האסטרטגית הייתה משמעותית יותר עד לאביב 2005, אז נסוגו הכוחות הסורים מלבנון לאחר ההתנקשות בראש הממשלה לשעבר, רפיק חרירי, התנקשות אשר בעקבותיה הופנתה אצבע מאשימה כלפי חיזבאללה והשלטון הסורי.

   איראן, לעומת זאת, היא סיפור אחר לגמרי. איראן מממנת את חיזבאללה מאז הקמתו ב- 1982. היא זו שמימנה את פעולות הטרור כנגד ארה"ב בשנות ה-80 ונגד ישראל. היא שאימנה את לוחמי חיזבאללה ומימנה קניית אמל"ח לסוגיו. היא זו שמימנה, ועודנה מממנת בניית בתי ספר, בתי חולים ובתי יתומים. היא זו שמשמשת כהשראה דתית לקהילה השיעית בלבנון בכלל, וחיזבאללה בפרט.

   לאור האירועים האחרונים בסוריה ובאיראן, כאשר נראה שימיו של בשאר אסד בשלטון ספורים ואיראן מרכזת את כל מאמציה בשימור תכנית הגרעין שלה והדיפת התקפות המערב, חיזבאללה נותר בצד. התכנית ארוכת הטווח לכיבוש לבנון, האופיינית כל כך לנסראללה, לא כללה את הפסקת תמיכתה של איראן, או נפילתו של בשאר אסד, אף שהאחרונה אינה כה משמעותית כאיראן.

   יציאתו של נסראללה לאור יום מסמלת את הכנות חיזבאללה ליום שאחרי. היום שאחרי אסד, היום שאחרי איראן חלשה ולא מתפקדת. בדיוק לעת זו פיתח חיזבאללה במהלך שני העשורים האחרונים מקורות מימון נוספים, כגון סחר בסמים בדרום אמריקה, סחר ביהלומי דמים ונשק במערב אפריקה, ואף הברחות בצפון אמריקה. בנוסף, לחיזבאללה רשת ענפה של עמותות צדקה ברחבי העולם, המשמשות למימון המוסדות הסוציאליים בלבנון, אך גם למימון פעולות הטרור. לעמותות הצדקה של חיזבאללה התווספו ב-2008 עמותות צדקה איראניות רבות, אשר איראן העבירה את השליטה עליהן לארגון כמחוות אמון.

   בנאומיו האחרונים אמר נסראללה כי כל פגיעה בסוריה ובאיראן יכולה להוביל למלחמה כוללת באזור. אין לזלזל באמירות אלו – הן מחייבות את נסראללה  בפני העולם הערבי, והוא לא יהסס ליישם אותן, גם אם בקנה מידה קטן יותר מהמובטח. עם זאת, יש לזכור כי נסראללה מחויב בראש ובראשונה למעמדו של חיזבאללה בלבנון ולשמירת היציבות, המעורערת במילא, של המערכת הפוליטית במדינה, ומחויבות זו גוברת על מחויבותו לאיראן וסוריה כיום.

   הצהרותיו כנגד ארה"ב וישראל אינן אלא ניסיון לזרות חול בעיני שומעיו ולהפחית מחשיבות התהליכים הבינלאומיים המתרחשים כיום בסוריה ואיראן. הוא מנסה להפנות את תשומת הלב לאויבים הטבעיים של העולם הערבי, שעל פיו הם הם הגורם לכל רעה חולה באזור.

הצהרות אלו מטרתן להכין את הקרקע להתערבות הבינלאומית הצפויה באזור בעקבות האירועים האחרונים, כאשר נסראללה מנסה למנוע תמיכה עתידית של הלבנונים והעם הערבי באויבותיו המושבעות.

   על נסראללה כעת להפגין את כוחו. בעצם יציאתו מהבונקר והופעתו בציבור, גם אם למספר דקות, הוא מדגיש את החשיבות העצומה שהוא והארגון מייחסים לקשר עם הציבור הערבי, והלבנוני-שיעי בפרט. בהופעתו זו הוא מוכיח, כי על אף שסוריה ואיראן נמצאות כיום תחת התקפה בינלאומית, ואף כלל-ערבית, חיזבאללה הוא בעל השליטה בלבנון ואין ולא יהיה לו תחליף, ולפיכך הוא יהווה גורם משמעותי בכל מהלך אזורי, חיובי או שלילי.