Nasrallah's Assassination - Yes or No?

   It is often asked: “Why does Israel not take the initiative and assassinate Nasrallah in order to destroy Hezbollah?” A common theory is that when the "head of the snake" has been taking off, the body will cease to exist. However, this is not the case. In order to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, one must adopt the assumption that assassination is a legitimate tool in asymmetric warfare. The moral issue (the fear of hurting innocent people) and the legal issue (execution without a fair trial) must be set aside in this analysis.

   The efficacy of an assassination has to be examined in light of the state actor’s interest. Effectiveness can be measured by several levels, such as the structure of the terrorist organization (hierarchical, networks etc.); possible successors, their character and agenda; the organization's response to the assassination, and the international community's response. In the last two decades a few leaders of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations were assassinated by states, and it seems like most of these operations did not achieved their intended purpose.

   Abbas Mussawi, second Secretary-General of Hezbollah (successor of Subhi al-Tufeyli, who was in duty from 1989 and was replaced due to his objection to Hezbollah's participation in national elections), who was one of the founders of the organization, was assassinated by Israel on February 16, 1992.

   The assassination was carried out in public, with combat helicopters shooting missiles at Mussawi’s convoy, killing him, his wife, son and four others. Hezbollah's retaliation was harsh – mega-terrorist attacks in the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community center in Argentina the same year. It is hard to believe that Israel would approve a public assassination if they were taking under consideration the retaliation or the identity of future successor, who might mark a bigger and more painful impact in the region.

   Since its founding, Hezbollah has been a hierarchical organization, with the Secretary-General at the top of the pyramid. The Secretary-General also leads the Decision-Making Shura Council (Religious clerks and Hezbollah's senior activists), and has a deputy. During the years Hezbollah has adapted and changed according to changing reality, needs and circumstances in the area. The biggest change occurred after 2006, when Hezbollah concentrated most of its wings under the Jihad Council and the direct control of Nasrallah.

   Israel tried this tactic again on February 12, 2008, with the assassination of Imad Mughniyah, military commander of Hezbollah. The assassination did not lead to Hezbollah's annihilation, and in contrast to Mussawi’s assassination did not cause a harsh retaliation. It has a few possible reasons. First, Hezbollah was occupied with its own issues in the Lebanese political arena. Second, the organization was still recovering from the damages of the war. Finally, an assassination of a military commander is a part of the game, unlike a political leader, and therefore its retaliation is "softer."

   Another example for an assassination that did not achieve its objective is the assassination in Ahmed Yassin, Hamas's leader and founder, on March 22, 2004. Yassin was released from Israeli prison in 1997. He was assassinated on his way to a morning prayer, along with two bodyguards. Yassin was eliminated as a threat but Hamas kept growing with massive terrorist attacks within Israel and took over Gaza by winning the democratic elections in 2006.

   The assassination of Osama Bin Laden by the Americans is exceptional in many ways. With his assassination, the U.S. wished to undermine Al-Qaeda, by removing its most significant symbol. This assassination achieved only partial success. Ayman al-Zawahiri replaced Bin Laden as the leader, and lives underground. Al-Zawahiri does not have the same charismatic personality as Bin Laden and his influence on the affiliated groups is minor. One must recall that the organization is built as a network of nodes and hubs, without a clear chain of command.

   Al-Qaeda has lost a part of its attraction. Its funding monies are not as plentiful as before, but the organization itself has changed. As for the organization's retaliation, apart from threats and minor attacks in the Middle East, no attack has been executed in Western countries up to date. And, still, Al-Qaeda exists and is apparently here to stay.

   These examples demonstrate the ineffectiveness of assassination as a means to destroy terrorist organizations, especially in the case of Hezbollah. Uncertainty appears in every consideration of analysis. Since Hezbollah is a hierarchical organization, Nasrallah will have a successor, whether Naim Qassem, Nasrallah's deputy, or the military commander, whose name is confidential. Will the future successor continue Nasrallah's legacy or might have more radical approach, in order to exceed his former?

   The regional reality is an additional factor. Syria is under the threat of a revolution and Iran is still trying to preserve its nuclear program, and hence their financial and strategic support is undependable. Nasrallah's successor would have to face a new and different reality, including using alternative funding resources to Iran, and no Syrian support. It is not inevitable that facing this reality would force him to develop a survival policy, i.e. returning to the 1980's terrorist attacks, in addition to activate the sleeping cells in North and South America, Asia and Africa.

   Another problem is the Lebanese domestic arena. Current Prime Minister Najib Mikati was designated under the influence of Nasrallah, and seemed to be a puppet until recently (when he agreed to pay Lebanon's part of the STL expenses, worth $34 Million). Mikati's loyalty to Nasrallah’s successor would be questionable and have a significant influence on Hezbollah's dominant position in Lebanon. An inferior position, after many years of establishing their control in Lebanon, might bring the organization into a defensive position, forcing it to execute a coup and strike fiercely against Israel.