Lebanese Army vs. Hezbollah – Who Wins?

   During his visit to Washington last week (December 8, 2011), Lebanese Finance Minister Mohammad Safadi raised a sensitive issue: American aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to Safadi, "Hezbollah’s role as an armed resistance in defending Lebanon would become moot if the country’s army was fully equipped and capable." Safadi also said that Hezbollah has no hold over the current Lebanese government. When approaching the discussion over allocation of aid to the LAF, members of the House committee will need to consider whether this support would indeed undermine Hezbollah’s position and make LAF the sole defender of Lebanon's security.

   First and foremost, it is essential to understand Lebanon’s importance in the international community. Indeed, it has no natural resources like many African countries, nor consumer power like China or India. Its importance resides with its symbolic clash between the Soviet bloc and the West in the past and the Islam and the West these days. Each side considers Lebanon as an “easy to influence” country due to its “failed” status and its political-sectarian system, based on personal and sectarian interests rather than national ones.

   American aid to Lebanon was initiated in 1946, when Lebanon became an independent state. In 1958 President Eisenhower sent 14,000 troops to support the first free elections, and to assure Lebanon's support for the pro-Western bloc. President Reagan sent troops to Lebanon in 1981 (six years after the civil war had started) as a part of an international peace-keeping force. They faced Palestinian terrorist organizations, AMAL (secular Shi'a terrorist organization), and beginning in 1982 – Hezbollah. In 1984, after suffering painful terrorist attacks with massive casualties, the U.S. withdrew from Lebanon and concentrated its efforts in mediating and financial and military aid.

   Up until 2005 the U.S. provided around $300 million annually in financial and military aid to Lebanon, including the training of LAF officers (over 3,000 officers were trained over the years in military academies in the U.S.). In 2005 the budget was decreased to $100 million and increased after the 2006 war, based on the thinking that assisting LAF would improve its position with respect to Hezbollah. The budget was frozen last August after the establishment of the new Lebanese government which included a Hezbollah majority. This is the budget Safadi is now asking to revive.

   We should be careful not to belittle Safadi's claims, but the truth has many faces, particularly in Lebanon. Since 2005, when participating for the first time in the government, Hezbollah caused multiple constitutional crises, occasionally involving political violence (2005, 2008). Hezbollah also holds sole responsibility for the constitutional crisis in January 2011, which lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the appointment of Najib Mikati. Each crisis resulted from Hezbollah's dissatisfaction with various governmental policies. Each crisis ended in a compromise favouring Hezbollah's interests above the national interest of Lebanon.

   This forgiveness and lenience towards Hezbollah is well rooted in Lebanese politics, and its origins lie in the constant fear of a return to civil war. Nasrallah, they believe, can "start a fire" at any given moment; this risk must be eradicated, at any price, even if it means surrendering to Hezbollah's demands.

   A few years ago Nasrallah stated that the army [LAF] defends the resistance [Hezbollah] and that the resistance is honored to be protected by the army. This saying has firm grounding, as Hezbollah's status as a "resistance organization" is clearly recognized in the Taif Accord (October 22, 1989) which ended the civil war. The Taif Accord included, amongst other things, the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, with the exception of Hezbollah. The reasoning behind this arrangement was that the LAF cannot oppose Israel in the South unaided, whereas Hezbollah, with its massive Iranian funding, can.

   At the end of the day, the objective of the two organizations is largely the same – defending Lebanon from external enemies, namely, Israel. It is very possible that in the next war with Israel, the LAF and Hezbollah will co-operate.

   As the situation in Lebanon currently stands, even a well equipped army cannot resist Hezbollah. The balance of power between Hezbollah and LAF, is not a military balance of power, but a political one, and it cannot be changed by additional financial aid to LAF. This should be the main consideration of the House Committee when deciding whether to revive military and financial aid to LAF. Hezbollah holds the majority of the cards in Lebanon today; even if from time to time is seems otherwise.

Data provided by CRS reports and publications in the Lebanese press; http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Dec-08/156320-safadi-to-us-arming-military-decreases-hezbollahs-role.ashx#axzz1g241h6cF