“Lebanon will begin a process of state building following the collapse of President Bashar Assad’s government.” (Samir Geagea, Lebanese Forces leader, to his party members, 1/1/2012).
Geagea is not alone in hoping that Lebanon’s political reality will change after Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses. Assad’s fall would have an immense impact on Lebanon even though Syria is no longer considered Hezbollah’s patron-state. Today, Syria is merely a strategic partner of Hezbollah and a channel of transferring weapons from Iran to Lebanon.
The March 14 bloc dreams of a Lebanon free from Syrian intrusion, with an intact political system. They envision a pro-Western state with no personal or sectarian intrigues. Can this dream come true after Assad’s fall? Sadly, it is probably the only unattainable scenario. Since the 1940’s, long before the Syrians entered Lebanon, the Lebanese political balance of power has been based on the different sects. The Taif Accord of 1989 perpetuated and institutionalized this practice by establishing sectarian requirements for major government positions, i.e. the President must be a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House is a Shi’a Muslim.
The March 8 bloc, headed by the Loyalty to the Resistance party (Hezbollah), aims for a different outcome. Edan Landau from Israel Defense argues that Hezbollah might use their influence in the Shiite majority in order to change the constitution. This possibility should not be ignored. However, it must be noted that in the past Hezbollah has chosen not to change the constitution, despite there being a Shiite majority in Lebanon (41%) for many years.
In light of the changing Sunni Middle East, there seem to be three possible scenarios to consider for a post-Assad Lebanon. The first scenario is the continuance of the current balance of terror - the on-going Hezbollahzation of Lebanon. During the last two decades Lebanese leaders have adjusted to the fact that Hezbollah is the sole Lebanese armed militia, as it and not the LAF was appointed the protector of the Southern border by the Taif Accord.
Just as Lebanon had its Hezbollahzation process, Hezbollah has gone through a Lebanonization process. Since Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary-General, the Lebanese-Shiite side of the organization has been strongly emphasized. The idea of creating an Islamic State became a utopian ideal of the group while more practical matters dominated the party platform. The Shiite community needed a political and social representation, and hence, in almost every speech, Nasrallah includes the idea of the unity of the Resistance and Lebanon.
This scenario is very reasonable. It means that Hezbollah remains behind the political scenes and raises its head every now and then to maintain its interests in the government and Lebanon.
The second scenario is a violent take-over of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah controls the government as it has major influence over Prime Minister Mikati. In the past, Hezbollah had utilized violent means in order to pursue political goals, such as a veto power in the government (2008). It is not unlikely that the organization would use this strategy again to ensure its political position and power.
In this case, Hezbollah would take the reins (commit a coup) and appoint its own government with no democratic elections. The consequences of such a coup are countless. Apart from benefiting from governing Lebanon according to its needs, Hezbollah would have to face a new reality as a State-Actor. It would have to fulfill international obligations of previous governments (e.g. the Special Tribunal for Hariri’s Assassination). Moreover, as a State-Actor, the organization could expose itself to international economic sanctions. Today, Hezbollah cannot afford to be exposed to such sanctions, especially when its patron state, Iran, is under the same sanctions itself.
The third scenario is the worst – the return of the civil war. This is a situation that all parties tried to avoid the last two decades. A civil war would have severe implications: a formation of an emergency government, in which no party can guarantee its control. In addition, the international community might consider military intervention, like in the 1980’s.
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that an international military intervention is not a trivial undertaking, as we can see from the current discussions about intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the only armed militia in Lebanon today is Hezbollah. Unlike in the 1980’s, no other sect, group or party has an organized armed militia. In this scenario, other sects would have to protect themselves and would form new armed militias to fight Hezbollah.
No one can predict what would happen in Lebanon the day after Assad’s fall. We can only hope for a better future and a full cooperation with the new Syrian regime.
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