The Puppet Show

   Only one year ago, on January 12, 2011, a bloc of 11 ministers loyal to Hezbollah toppled Saad Hariri's government. These defections followed a dispute over the U.N.-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The STL was expected to implicate Hezbollah members in Hariri’s assassination, though Hezbollah denies any connection to the assassination. Two weeks after unseating the government, Najib Mikati was approved to premiership by 68 parliament members, a majority of Hezbollah and its March 8 allies.

   

   The March 8 coalition’s backing of Mikati created the perception of him as "Hassan Nasrallah's Marionette" or "Hezbollah's Puppet" in the Lebanese and international media. However, Mikati has proven his independence from those backers several times until he completely disobeyed Nasrallah on the STL issue. What made Mikati cast off the puppet strings?

   

   Firstly, it is important to understand why Nasrallah chose Mikati as his candidate for the premiership. Mikati is an educated Sunni Muslim, who made his fortune in telecommunications. Nasrallah, by contrast, is a radical Shiite leader, who dedicated his life to the destruction of Israel and the welfare of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. Mikati served as Prime Minister for three months in 2005 (following the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami), but Nasrallah has never been directly involved in politics and always prefers to be behind scenes.

   

   The alleged connection between the two is unclear and that is precisely what is so brilliant about Nasrallah's choice. Mikati is considered to be moderate, but expressed a pro-Syrian standpoint and has expressed support for the resistance in the disarmament and STL conflicts.

   

   Thus, when the consultations to form the new government began, Mikati was optimistic and said he insists on forming a government that satisfies all Lebanese citizens. However, the gaps between Nasrallah's demands and the March 14 alliance were too wide, particularly regarding the STL issue. The latter alliance urged him to uphold the STL in the face of calls by Hezbollah and its allies to sever ties with the tribunal. The March 14 bloc also sought Mikati’s public commitment not to disavow the STL, while Hezbollah demanded just the opposite. Mikati refused to make a commitment to any party, stressing that conflicting demands by the rival factions could be solved through dialogue.

   Nonetheless, since May 2011 Nasrallah has implied to the media that American pressure and not internal disagreement is what obstructs Mikati’s government formation. Obviously, the Hezbollah leader was not satisfied with the delayed process and needs to clarify that he is the operator and Mikati the Puppet.

  

   Mikati's response was to emphasize that “the fact that Hezbollah and its allies have 18 seats in the 30-member Cabinet does not mean that the country will join the radical camp in terms of its relations with the international community,” as he announced in the press conference about his government lineup.

   

   In addition, Mikati stressed the significance of more than one-third of the Cabinet ministers having been appointed by himself, the President, and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt, to ensure Hezbollah and its allies could not control the government. This announcement calms international community and addresses the opposition's concerns. It makes Nasrallah look like he is no longer the puppet operator, and paints Mikati as the one in charge.

   

   The main conflict was, and still is, the STL. For a few months Mikati followed Nasrallah's orders by refusing to pay Lebanon's share of funding the STL and by not arresting Hezbollah members accused of involvement in the assassination. However, Mikati agreed in November 2011 to pay Lebanon's share ($36 Million). He did satisfy Nasrallah by saying that Lebanon cannot find the suspects. Nevertheless, agreeing to pay is a severe violation of Nasrallah's trust.

  

   It seems that taking office was the turning point in Mikati's status as a puppet, when realized he cannot renounce his predecessor’s international obligations. Surprisingly, Nasrallah did not react fiercely, and the question remains why. 

  

   Perhaps what most concerns Nasrallah is the future fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the severe economic sanctions on Iran. The latter could harm the major funding Hezbollah receives from Iran.

   

   Only a year ago it looked like Nasrallah could not lose and that his years-long patience had paid off. But the euphoria lasted only a few months – the Syrian spring started, the economic sanctions on Iran became most stringent, and Mikati’s rebelliousness deteriorated. Nasrallah has to find a way to regain control of the Puppet Show, and a war against Israel is not an unlikely possibility. Can a war against Israel be used as an effective solution to his domestic problems as it was in the past? We have to wait and see.  


Data provided by publications in the Lebanese press.