After almost a year, designated
Prime Minister Tammam Salam has finally managed to form a 24-member Cabinet, prior
to the upcoming presidential elections in May. The efforts of Salam and his mediator,
MP Walid Jumblatt, deserve applause due to the major challenges and differences
between the March 14 and the March 8 alliances. However, this government, in
its current formation, raises a few queries.
The first core issue of disagreement between
the two sides was the portfolio given to Ashraf Rifi, who was Salam’s nominee
for Minister of Interior. Hezbollah refused for months to this nomination, and
eventually accepted Rifi as the Minister of Justice. Since Salam noted his
government adopted the principle of rotating ministerial portfolios based on
party and sect, it is hard to tell what is planned for Rifi in the future, and
when.
Secondly, the government is based on 8-8-8
lineup in which eight ministers are allotted to the March 8 and March 14
coalitions each. The rest of the ministers were chosen by the president, the
prime minister-designate and Jumblatt. Moreover, this formula effectively
grants both camps veto power, which establishes another core challenge for the
new Cabinet. Both camps can put spokes in the Cabinet’s wheels as they wish and
the options are countless, yet the most important are right around the corner -
the presidential elections are in May, and the electoral law, the apple of
Hezbollah’s eye, is waiting for another round in the public eye. Hezbollah was
under a lot of pressure lately, and allowing this compromise of giving March 14
alliance a veto power as well, only means that Salam’s government’s days are numbered.
The spill-over of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon,
as well as the suicide bombings inside Hezbollah’s territories, have made the
situation of the new government even more challenging. Its open involvement in
the Syrian civil war led Hezbollah into a trap within the coalition’s negotiation.
Additionally, the compromise that Hezbollah has made to get into this Cabinet is
enormous, since the organization required exclusive veto power for a long time.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s willingness to negotiate for this exclusiveness proves of
their distress due to recent events, and maybe of their need of some stability
in Lebanon, as much as possible.
One should remember that Hezbollah, who for the
common Western observer may be viewed as a terrorist group – is a hybrid
organization – with a responsibility to its reputation and its people. It is
not only a resistance group, or a terrorist organization, but a very powerful
political party in Lebanon and a social movement as well, with a wide and deeply
rooted infrastructure all around Lebanon, who Hassan Nasrallah cares for it. Furthermore,
Hezbollah has always been considered as a proxy army of Iran, but it is first
and foremost a Lebanese organization, and as such, it is obliged to the Lebanese
people and the Shiite community in particular.
All parties in Lebanon are interested in one
thing, more than anything, regardless of their sectarian belonging: avoiding
another Lebanese civil war. When will one of the parties lose its patience? Only
time will tell. How far will Salam’s government reach? In the end, it is all in
Nasrallah’s hands.
