Sunday, February 26, 2012

Hezbollah's Disarmament and Syrian Spring

   Hezbollah’s disarmament became, and has remained, one of the most controversial topics in Lebanon following the Taif Accords of 1989. The Accord affixed Hezbollah’s status as a “resistance organization,” officially approving its arming and leaving all other militias (e.g. the Christian Falanges) disarmed. From that day on, Hezbollah's disarmament has been a very contentious issue in Lebanon, and has been recently mentioned in speeches by members of the March 14 alliance "support the Syrian resistance”.
   Earlier this week, Lebanese president Michel Sleiman said that in light of the possibility of the Syrian crisis spilling over into Lebanon "we need to discuss ways to benefit from Hezbollah's arms, when to use them and for what purpose." With this statement he clearly supports Hezbollah’s position, which rejects demands for their disarmament as aimed by Israel, and claim they are protecting Lebanon from Israeli aggression. Perhaps this time of upheaval is the opportunity to re-examine whether the Lebanese government should accept Hezbollah’s position and take disarmament off the table.   
   Several scenarios exist regarding Hezbollah keeping its arms, but all hinge upon whether the organization stays with its decision to back President Assad or change its stance by supporting the Syrian revolt. Today, Hezbollah firmly insists that it will continue to support President Assad, although there is no evidence that the organization’s members are currently fighting alongside Syrian soldiers. Recently, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has been encouraging Nasrallah to publicly support the Syrian people, due to claims that President Assad’s days are numbered.
   It is possible that if the fighting in Syria escalates and spills over into Lebanon, Hezbollah would decide to take control of Lebanon violently. The organization’s weapons arsenal is large and the addition of the Syrian army’s weapons arsenal would pave the way to defeat the Lebanese army (LAF) and conquer Lebanon. This scenario, however, seems unlikely to materialize under the present circumstances.
   On the other hand, should Hezbollah decide to support the Syrian people, it is not unlikely that it would cooperate with LAF to keep the Syrian army from breaching Lebanon's borders. Nasrallah has previously stated that Hezbollah and LAF can be merged, and although his intent was to fight against the Zionist State and not Syrian army, it is not an unfeasible option. Nevertheless, it should be noted that though uniting Hezbollah’s and LAF’s arsenals might lead to a substantial military force, it may not be enough to stand against Assad's army.
   Hezbollah stood by and watched the two-day clashes in Tripoli last week between supporters and opponents of Assad's regime. This might symbolize the organization's actual standpoint - staying neutral. As the fighting would spills over into Lebanon, the organization could earn more time to consider its moves. It is possible that Hezbollah would allow blood to be shed by Assad's supporters until it reaches a decision.
   Hezbollah's disarmament would bring significant change into Lebanese political system as well as to the Middle Eastern balance of terror. Hezbollah would lose its deterrent power, and the very necessity of the organization would be in question. Its internal enemies would celebrate their victory on this long-standing controversial issue and its external enemies (Israel and the West) would face a less threatening new reality.
   Though it sounds ridiculous, Hezbollah is a stabilizing factor in the explosive Middle East. The organization preserves the balance of terror between itself and Israel and the West, and has not executed terrorist attacks in these uneasy times (the most recent attacks against Israeli targets were executed by Iranian activists, without Hezbollah's involvement). Today, Hezbollah does no more than paying a lip service to President Assad, and with Nasrallah as a leader, Hezbollah has more pragmatic considerations than fanatic ones.
   Hezbollah's disarmament would lead to a new era in Lebanese history, but would not be a smart move under the present conditions. In the eyes of Lebanese people and their politicians, Lebanon is an easy target to Assad's army and might fall if LAF was left alone to protect its borders.


Sources: Lebanese press

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

If Israel Strikes Iran...

   Some commentators say that if Israel strikes Iran, Hezbollah will attack Israel to protect its patron state. This assessment could be accurate and there is little doubt that Hezbollah is eagerly looking for an excuse to attack Israel. However, the conclusion that Hezbollah would retaliate on Iran’s behalf is incorrect. This finding only serves to intimidate the public, as well as an Israeli attempt of deterrence.
   There are some analysts who claim that if Israel strikes Iran, Pakistan, Hamas and Hezbollah will attack Israel. An Iranian counter-strike is also a fair possibility. However, a Pakistani retaliatory strike is not a realistic possibility for several reasons. Firstly, though Pakistan has nuclear warheads, it does not possess long-range missiles like Iran does.
   Secondly, Pakistan is more concerned with the ongoing tension between itself and India than with Middle East affairs. Pakistan is also concerned with the presence of American intelligence agencies on its soil (including the bin-Laden assassination, which was executed without Pakistani consent). This preoccupation dwarfs any interest in an Israeli attack on Iran.
   Thirdly, American accusations of the collaboration of the Pakistani army with terrorist organizations do not encourage a fruitful cooperation with the West on counter-terrorism issues. In any event, owning warheads is not the same as using them. Pakistan would need a better reason to use these weapons than a strike on their neighbor on the western border.
   It is probable that Hamas will not attack Israel any more severely than they would under the current circumstances. It is important to note that radical Islamic organizations, and not Hamas, cause the escalation between Gaza and Israel. As of now, Hamas is engaged with their reconciliation agreement with Fatah. A third Intifada is out of the question due to financial and political limitations.
   Hezbollah must pay a lip service to Iran for years of sponsorship, as it did with Syria since the Syrian Spring has begun. It is well remembered that Nasrallah declared Hezbollah would support Bashar al-Assad by hook or by crook. In fact, the assistance Nasrallah has provided to Assad has been minimal. Initially, Hezbollah's activists, who were visible at first in the Syrian arena, are now nowhere to be seen. Furthermore, the recent kidnapping of Lebanese citizens by the Syrian army lead to enough outrage in Lebanon to make Hezbollah unwilling to take part in the coming Syrian civil war.
   What will Hezbollah do if Israel strikes Iran? Is it reasonable to assume that Hezbollah would attack Israel as it did in July 2006? Most likely not.
As in Syria, Hezbollah does not want to destabilize Lebanon, which it can control today. The organization also does not want to actively intervene to support a leader who will step down in the next few months. Moreover, Hezbollah recently served as a mediator in a cabinet crisis, proving its loyalty to all Lebanese citizens.
   Hezbollah would not pay more than lip service to Iran, which is under severe international economic sanctions including blocking government and central bank's assets. Since 1982, Iran has given Hezbollah an annual budget, but in the past few years the size of the payments has decreased and the disbursements were occasionally entirely frozen. Today, Hezbollah cannot depend upon Iranian economic support, and has therefore expanded its illicit drug activity in South America.

    
At the end of the day, Hezbollah cannot actually protect Iran from Israel; it can only show its solidarity. However, Hezbollah is not suicidal and would abandon its expression of solidarity if its own survival was at stake. Criticism of Hezbollah after the July 2006 war made it hard for the organization to rehabilitate as it had many opponents. Since then, Hezbollah has chosen to focus on the domestic arena, even at the cost of ignoring the Zionist enemy in the South and turning its back to its patrons. Nasrallah has to prove his people that Hezbollah is an independent entity capable of running Lebanon with a firm hand, for the benefit of all of the Lebanese people.