Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?

   This week, in the highly anticipated Egyptian elections, the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood won 235 of the 498 seats in the lower house of parliament. The Salafist party, Al Nour, won 123 seats.

   These are Sunni Islamist parties, so this new parliament, unlike the past secular houses, will be Islamist-dominated. At the latest, the presidential elections will be held in June 2012, and it is still unclear whether the new political system will be presidential or parliamentary. In the light of the recent success of Islamist parties, the question arises: “Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?”

   Hassan al-Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928 with the goal of peacefully transforming secular Middle Eastern states into Islamic religious states. To this end, the movement established social institutions in Arab states such as schools, mosques, kindergartens and charitable organizations. Its activists were hounded by various Arab rulers since the 1960’s, perhaps because the movement threatened the political and social status quo of these. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia is already a religious state and has still banned the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Saudi Arabia has its Wahhabi version of Sharia law, and Iran has its Shi’a version.

   Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists emerged from secrecy proudly. The Islamist majority in the parliament demonstrates the public’s preference for religious parties over secular ones, and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces may have lost control of the country.

   An Islamic state is not necessarily a bad thing in the eyes of an Arab beholder. A religious state is considered to be less corrupt than a monarchy and more devoted to protecting the interests of the citizens. Indeed, a religious state is seen by many to be an improvement over the past crooked dictatorships. As far as Egyptians are concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood is their social, economic and moral lifeline.

   The problems in Egypt will surface when the religious regime becomes radical. Other religious minorities will be persecuted for their beliefs and the implementation of Sharia law will become stricter, as Saudi Arabia. Egypt might suffer an economic blow as its sizeable tourism sector shrinks due to decreasing numbers of foreign tourists. Many Western travelers would be deterred by restrictions such as modest clothes and prohibition of women in certain public places.

   An increasingly Islamist-dominated Middle East presents several problems for the Western world and Israel. Firstly, a religious regime applies a radically different mindset to decision-making. A national Shura Council would advise the government through Sharia law rather than political rationality. Decisions made in this manner might be detrimental to Western interests in the area.

   Secondly, an Islamic state traditionally singles out Israel and the United States as the great evils of the world. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt denies that it would move to nullify the peace accord with Israel, but it has declared that the accord should be re-examined to see if it harms the country and the Egyptian people. There is a possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood or its Ulamas (religious scholars) would decide to rescind the peace treaty due to religious justifications.

   Finally, even if the Islamic parties won a majority democratically, there is no assurance that they would uphold the democratic system following the election. In fact, the Iranian revolution of 1979 is an example of democratically elected religious parties seizing control and dismantling the very system that brought them to power. A religious majority in the legislature can pass religious laws, even though the new speaker, Saad al-Katatni of the Freedom and Justice party, said that “we want to build a new Egypt, a constitutional, democratic and modern Egypt.”  

   There is no doubt that the Egyptian case is complex and the Muslim Brotherhood movement is standing at a new crossroads. They are not hunted and are in the most powerful positions. Will they leverage their current position in order to promote their Islamic agenda, or will they call for democratization and modernity? If they choose the latter option, it is hard to see how it can be done within the framework of Sharia law.

            
  

Combating Terrorism Financing - A Cultural Approach

   Culture is the language of a nation - its books, poetry and traditions. In order for two nations to engage in a fruitful discussion, it is important for both to understand the other side's culture and moreover, respect it. Samuel Huntington's cultural civilizations cannot communicate with one another because they don't know or try to understand the other's cultural norms.

   

   The importance of cultural perception pertains to states and their strategies to combat terrorism financing. Cultural differences are also present in the nefarious use of charitable organizations by terrorist groups. Muslim terrorist groups ascribe to the concept of Jihad bil-Mal (financial Jihad against the infidels) and therefore justify this misuse. The same principle also gives religious rationalization to the practice of establishing new charitable organizations in order to funnel charitable funds for terrorist purposes such as buying weapons or training of fighters.

   

   All current counter-financing terrorism strategies are geared toward countering money-laundering, and do not prevent terrorists from misusing charitable organizations. Money-laundering counter-strategies cope with the practical matters of terrorist groups funneling money and do not consider any cultural aspects. The existing strategies are not able to address unique cultural elements such as traditional financial systems as Hawala or Islamic banks, which leave no visible paper trail. Therefore, a cultural shift in strategy is needed.

  

   Every strategy that seeks to counter the misuse of charitable organizations by terrorist groups should consider Muslim and Arab cultural norms. The charity in question, Zakat, is one of the five pillars of Islam (in addition to faith- shahada, prayer- salat, annual fasting during the month of Ramadan- sawm, and the once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca- hajj). This is a sacred religious requirement and should be honored by the West. Honor is the key word in Muslim and Arab culture, and every individual's deed is evaluated by the honor it brings to himself, his family, his town or his nation.

   

   The condescending attitude of Western, particularly American, law enforcement agencies creates hostility in Muslim communities regarding the counter-financing terrorism campaign. Consequently, these communities are not willing to cooperate with authorities, the "outsiders."

   

   It is not unlikely that if Muslim communities in Western countries felt appreciated and honored, a fruitful cooperation could emerge to the benefit of both parties. Counter-strategies should focus culturally on charitable organizations rather than financially; the campaign should be Arab-Muslim-oriented, and most essentially, led by Muslim leaders from every country. No success can be achieved without the cooperation of Muslim communities.

   

   A culturally focused strategy might serve as more a deterrent than the currently existing strategies. A successful campaign explaining the disadvantages and consequences of contributing Zakat funds to terrorism could dissuade charitable organizations from cooperate with terrorists. In this way, even when charitable organizations and terrorist groups have proximity to each other (e.g. war zones), charitable organizations might resist the influence of the terrorist group. All this assumes that the charitable organizations are able to choose their own path.

   

   The lack of transparency of Muslim charitable organizations is the biggest obstacle to overcome, and thus an Achilles Heel of any counter-strategy. There are many charitable organizations that have no connection to terrorism. Therefore, it is essential to institute a campaign explaining the importance of transparency, both of the organization and the donor, in order to clear any accusation of connections to terrorist groups.

   

   Some might argue that a culturally oriented campaign for counter- financing terrorism is naïve, but it could help where existing policies have failed. Current strategies cannot prevent the misuse of charitable organizations.

Who knows, it might work.

The Puppet Show

   Only one year ago, on January 12, 2011, a bloc of 11 ministers loyal to Hezbollah toppled Saad Hariri's government. These defections followed a dispute over the U.N.-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The STL was expected to implicate Hezbollah members in Hariri’s assassination, though Hezbollah denies any connection to the assassination. Two weeks after unseating the government, Najib Mikati was approved to premiership by 68 parliament members, a majority of Hezbollah and its March 8 allies.

   

   The March 8 coalition’s backing of Mikati created the perception of him as "Hassan Nasrallah's Marionette" or "Hezbollah's Puppet" in the Lebanese and international media. However, Mikati has proven his independence from those backers several times until he completely disobeyed Nasrallah on the STL issue. What made Mikati cast off the puppet strings?

   

   Firstly, it is important to understand why Nasrallah chose Mikati as his candidate for the premiership. Mikati is an educated Sunni Muslim, who made his fortune in telecommunications. Nasrallah, by contrast, is a radical Shiite leader, who dedicated his life to the destruction of Israel and the welfare of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. Mikati served as Prime Minister for three months in 2005 (following the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami), but Nasrallah has never been directly involved in politics and always prefers to be behind scenes.

   

   The alleged connection between the two is unclear and that is precisely what is so brilliant about Nasrallah's choice. Mikati is considered to be moderate, but expressed a pro-Syrian standpoint and has expressed support for the resistance in the disarmament and STL conflicts.

   

   Thus, when the consultations to form the new government began, Mikati was optimistic and said he insists on forming a government that satisfies all Lebanese citizens. However, the gaps between Nasrallah's demands and the March 14 alliance were too wide, particularly regarding the STL issue. The latter alliance urged him to uphold the STL in the face of calls by Hezbollah and its allies to sever ties with the tribunal. The March 14 bloc also sought Mikati’s public commitment not to disavow the STL, while Hezbollah demanded just the opposite. Mikati refused to make a commitment to any party, stressing that conflicting demands by the rival factions could be solved through dialogue.

   Nonetheless, since May 2011 Nasrallah has implied to the media that American pressure and not internal disagreement is what obstructs Mikati’s government formation. Obviously, the Hezbollah leader was not satisfied with the delayed process and needs to clarify that he is the operator and Mikati the Puppet.

  

   Mikati's response was to emphasize that “the fact that Hezbollah and its allies have 18 seats in the 30-member Cabinet does not mean that the country will join the radical camp in terms of its relations with the international community,” as he announced in the press conference about his government lineup.

   

   In addition, Mikati stressed the significance of more than one-third of the Cabinet ministers having been appointed by himself, the President, and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt, to ensure Hezbollah and its allies could not control the government. This announcement calms international community and addresses the opposition's concerns. It makes Nasrallah look like he is no longer the puppet operator, and paints Mikati as the one in charge.

   

   The main conflict was, and still is, the STL. For a few months Mikati followed Nasrallah's orders by refusing to pay Lebanon's share of funding the STL and by not arresting Hezbollah members accused of involvement in the assassination. However, Mikati agreed in November 2011 to pay Lebanon's share ($36 Million). He did satisfy Nasrallah by saying that Lebanon cannot find the suspects. Nevertheless, agreeing to pay is a severe violation of Nasrallah's trust.

  

   It seems that taking office was the turning point in Mikati's status as a puppet, when realized he cannot renounce his predecessor’s international obligations. Surprisingly, Nasrallah did not react fiercely, and the question remains why. 

  

   Perhaps what most concerns Nasrallah is the future fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the severe economic sanctions on Iran. The latter could harm the major funding Hezbollah receives from Iran.

   

   Only a year ago it looked like Nasrallah could not lose and that his years-long patience had paid off. But the euphoria lasted only a few months – the Syrian spring started, the economic sanctions on Iran became most stringent, and Mikati’s rebelliousness deteriorated. Nasrallah has to find a way to regain control of the Puppet Show, and a war against Israel is not an unlikely possibility. Can a war against Israel be used as an effective solution to his domestic problems as it was in the past? We have to wait and see.  


Data provided by publications in the Lebanese press.

If Assad Falls – The Lebanese Arena

    “Lebanon will begin a process of state building following the collapse of President Bashar Assad’s government.”                                (Samir Geagea, Lebanese Forces leader, to his party members, 1/1/2012).

   Geagea is not alone in hoping that Lebanon’s political reality will change after Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses. Assad’s fall would have an immense impact on Lebanon even though Syria is no longer considered Hezbollah’s patron-state. Today, Syria is merely a strategic partner of Hezbollah and a channel of transferring weapons from Iran to Lebanon.

   The March 14 bloc dreams of a Lebanon free from Syrian intrusion, with an intact political system. They envision a pro-Western state with no personal or sectarian intrigues. Can this dream come true after Assad’s fall? Sadly, it is probably the only unattainable scenario. Since the 1940’s, long before the Syrians entered Lebanon, the Lebanese political balance of power has been based on the different sects. The Taif Accord of 1989 perpetuated and institutionalized this practice by establishing sectarian requirements for major government positions, i.e. the President must be a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House is a Shi’a Muslim.

   The March 8 bloc, headed by the Loyalty to the Resistance party (Hezbollah), aims for a different outcome. Edan Landau from Israel Defense argues that Hezbollah might use their influence in the Shiite majority in order to change the constitution. This possibility should not be ignored. However, it must be noted that in the past Hezbollah has chosen not to change the constitution, despite there being a Shiite majority in Lebanon (41%) for many years.

   In light of the changing Sunni Middle East, there seem to be three possible scenarios to consider for a post-Assad Lebanon. The first scenario is the continuance of the current balance of terror - the on-going Hezbollahzation of Lebanon. During the last two decades Lebanese leaders have adjusted to the fact that Hezbollah is the sole Lebanese armed militia, as it and not the LAF was appointed the protector of the Southern border by the Taif Accord.

   Just as Lebanon had its Hezbollahzation process, Hezbollah has gone through a Lebanonization process. Since Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary-General, the Lebanese-Shiite side of the organization has been strongly emphasized. The idea of creating an Islamic State became a utopian ideal of the group while more practical matters dominated the party platform. The Shiite community needed a political and social representation, and hence, in almost every speech, Nasrallah includes the idea of the unity of the Resistance and Lebanon.

   This scenario is very reasonable. It means that Hezbollah remains behind the political scenes and raises its head every now and then to maintain its interests in the government and Lebanon.

   The second scenario is a violent take-over of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah controls the government as it has major influence over Prime Minister Mikati. In the past, Hezbollah had utilized violent means in order to pursue political goals, such as a veto power in the government (2008). It is not unlikely that the organization would use this strategy again to ensure its political position and power.

   In this case, Hezbollah would take the reins (commit a coup) and appoint its own government with no democratic elections. The consequences of such a coup are countless. Apart from benefiting from governing Lebanon according to its needs, Hezbollah would have to face a new reality as a State-Actor. It would have to fulfill international obligations of previous governments (e.g. the Special Tribunal for Hariri’s Assassination). Moreover, as a State-Actor, the organization could expose itself to international economic sanctions. Today, Hezbollah cannot afford to be exposed to such sanctions, especially when its patron state, Iran, is under the same sanctions itself.

   The third scenario is the worst – the return of the civil war. This is a situation that all parties tried to avoid the last two decades. A civil war would have severe implications: a formation of an emergency government, in which no party can guarantee its control. In addition, the international community might consider military intervention, like in the 1980’s.

   Nonetheless, it is important to remember that an international military intervention is not a trivial undertaking, as we can see from the current discussions about intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the only armed militia in Lebanon today is Hezbollah. Unlike in the 1980’s, no other sect, group or party has an organized armed militia. In this scenario, other sects would have to protect themselves and would form new armed militias to fight Hezbollah.

   No one can predict what would happen in Lebanon the day after Assad’s fall. We can only hope for a better future and a full cooperation with the new Syrian regime.

Sources:

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jan-01/158502-geagea-lebanon-to-begin-state-building-after-assads-fall.ashx#axzz1iCQ8sfQn

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=514&ArticleID=743