I'm Here, I'm Here!!

On Friday, May 11^th, Hassan Nasrallah publically referred to Hezbollah’s ability to launch long-range missiles at Tel Aviv. This announcement took place during a ceremony that celebrated the completion of the 5-year “Waad” project to rebuild the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The project was launched by the Jihad al-Binaa Organization after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, and has been funded by Iran. For Nasrallah, these types of statements are neither surprising, nor new. Nasrallah feels left out.

Governments in the region and around the world are currently facing a variety of challenges: bloodshed in Syria, economic sanctions on Iran, a potential Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and economic crises in Europe. No one remembers Hezbollah, once a powerful and influential figure, who threatened and destabilized the Levant.

Indeed, in the last few months Nasrallah announced that in the case of an Israeli attack on Iran, Hezbollah will reciprocally attack Israel. Also, Nasrallah has lately stated that his organization will stand next to President Bashar al-Assad if there is a Western attack on Syria. However, as Nasrallah has done nothing to execute his threats, these statements seem to be an empty shell.

Unfortunately for Nasrallah, it seems that just as governments ignore Hezbollah, so does the Israeli media. Historically the media has terrified the Israeli public with reports of the organization, but it seems that those same outlets have forgotten Hezbollah and what it is capable of. The Israeli media is fixated on the Iranian threat, and barely mentions Hezbollah. No one looks to the Northern border and not all remember the 2006 damages Hezbollah had caused.

It is in this context Nasrallah stressed that

“Lebanon is still in the circle of the “Israeli” threat.” “The resistance that they wanted to destroy increased in its strength and capabilities,” he said, “assuring that “the hand that reconstructed remains on weapons to impose new equations.”

In the Lebanese domestic arena, however, Hezbollah is more relevant than ever. It is one of the most influential parties in Lebanon. Lately, in addition to concern over the spill-over of the Syrian crisis to Tripoli, the hot topic on the table is the electoral law. Brought by the Lebanese Interior Minister, Marwan Charbel, the new electoral law is based on proportional representation and will take effect in the 2013 parliamentary polls. The proposition had sparked controversy among the rival political parties, as the March 14 alliance rejected the proposal, while the March 8 bloc have voiced support for it.

Hezbollah reiterated that proportional representation is the most adequate option, as it reveals and represents the real weight of each party in the country. The Shiite community in Lebanon is estimated to be around 2,500,000 inhabitants, i.e. 60.7% of the population. Passing the proposal in the next few months would assured the victory of Hezbollah and its allies in the next elections.

   

        As always, Hezbollah wants to stay pertinent in the Lebanese arena as well as in regional and international arenas. The path Nasrallah is choosing is one of tempestuous statements against its standard enemies: Israel and the United States. However, these statements have not made the organization seem as fierce as it once was. Hezbollah increasingly looks to be the backup force of Syria and Iran rather than a powerful ethnic militant group.

   

     Nasrallah feels left out. Maybe no one cares anymore. He wants to draw the world's attention and he chooses a childish way of doing so – he shouts the loudest, hoping to get attention. And if that doesn't work, he can always pick a fight. He has the ability to launch long-range missiles at Tel Aviv, you know.

Citation from Hezbollah’s official website:

 http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=19893&cid=313

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/40486-nasrallah-s-political-aide-urges-govt-to-assume-responsibility-throughout-lebanon

See also: “Lebanon Demographics Profile 2012,” Index Mundi, n.d. available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/lebanon/demographics_profile.html; “Mapping the Global Muslim Population – a Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” PEW Research Center, October 2009, available at:

http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf

Hezbollah's Disarmament and Syrian Spring

   Hezbollah’s disarmament became, and has remained, one of the most controversial topics in Lebanon following the Taif Accords of 1989. The Accord affixed Hezbollah’s status as a “resistance organization,” officially approving its arming and leaving all other militias (e.g. the Christian Falanges) disarmed. From that day on, Hezbollah's disarmament has been a very contentious issue in Lebanon, and has been recently mentioned in speeches by members of the March 14 alliance "support the Syrian resistance”.

   Earlier this week, Lebanese president Michel Sleiman said that in light of the possibility of the Syrian crisis spilling over into Lebanon "we need to discuss ways to benefit from Hezbollah's arms, when to use them and for what purpose." With this statement he clearly supports Hezbollah’s position, which rejects demands for their disarmament as aimed by Israel, and claim they are protecting Lebanon from Israeli aggression. Perhaps this time of upheaval is the opportunity to re-examine whether the Lebanese government should accept Hezbollah’s position and take disarmament off the table.   

   Several scenarios exist regarding Hezbollah keeping its arms, but all hinge upon whether the organization stays with its decision to back President Assad or change its stance by supporting the Syrian revolt. Today, Hezbollah firmly insists that it will continue to support President Assad, although there is no evidence that the organization’s members are currently fighting alongside Syrian soldiers. Recently, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has been encouraging Nasrallah to publicly support the Syrian people, due to claims that President Assad’s days are numbered.

   It is possible that if the fighting in Syria escalates and spills over into Lebanon, Hezbollah would decide to take control of Lebanon violently. The organization’s weapons arsenal is large and the addition of the Syrian army’s weapons arsenal would pave the way to defeat the Lebanese army (LAF) and conquer Lebanon. This scenario, however, seems unlikely to materialize under the present circumstances.

   On the other hand, should Hezbollah decide to support the Syrian people, it is not unlikely that it would cooperate with LAF to keep the Syrian army from breaching Lebanon's borders. Nasrallah has previously stated that Hezbollah and LAF can be merged, and although his intent was to fight against the Zionist State and not Syrian army, it is not an unfeasible option. Nevertheless, it should be noted that though uniting Hezbollah’s and LAF’s arsenals might lead to a substantial military force, it may not be enough to stand against Assad's army.

   Hezbollah stood by and watched the two-day clashes in Tripoli last week between supporters and opponents of Assad's regime. This might symbolize the organization's actual standpoint - staying neutral. As the fighting would spills over into Lebanon, the organization could earn more time to consider its moves. It is possible that Hezbollah would allow blood to be shed by Assad's supporters until it reaches a decision.

   Hezbollah's disarmament would bring significant change into Lebanese political system as well as to the Middle Eastern balance of terror. Hezbollah would lose its deterrent power, and the very necessity of the organization would be in question. Its internal enemies would celebrate their victory on this long-standing controversial issue and its external enemies (Israel and the West) would face a less threatening new reality.

   Though it sounds ridiculous, Hezbollah is a stabilizing factor in the explosive Middle East. The organization preserves the balance of terror between itself and Israel and the West, and has not executed terrorist attacks in these uneasy times (the most recent attacks against Israeli targets were executed by Iranian activists, without Hezbollah's involvement). Today, Hezbollah does no more than paying a lip service to President Assad, and with Nasrallah as a leader, Hezbollah has more pragmatic considerations than fanatic ones.

   Hezbollah's disarmament would lead to a new era in Lebanese history, but would not be a smart move under the present conditions. In the eyes of Lebanese people and their politicians, Lebanon is an easy target to Assad's army and might fall if LAF was left alone to protect its borders.


Sources: Lebanese press

If Israel Strikes Iran...

   Some commentators say that if Israel strikes Iran, Hezbollah will attack Israel to protect its patron state. This assessment could be accurate and there is little doubt that Hezbollah is eagerly looking for an excuse to attack Israel. However, the conclusion that Hezbollah would retaliate on Iran’s behalf is incorrect. This finding only serves to intimidate the public, as well as an Israeli attempt of deterrence.

   There are some analysts who claim that if Israel strikes Iran, Pakistan, Hamas and Hezbollah will attack Israel. An Iranian counter-strike is also a fair possibility. However, a Pakistani retaliatory strike is not a realistic possibility for several reasons. Firstly, though Pakistan has nuclear warheads, it does not possess long-range missiles like Iran does.

   Secondly, Pakistan is more concerned with the ongoing tension between itself and India than with Middle East affairs. Pakistan is also concerned with the presence of American intelligence agencies on its soil (including the bin-Laden assassination, which was executed without Pakistani consent). This preoccupation dwarfs any interest in an Israeli attack on Iran.

   Thirdly, American accusations of the collaboration of the Pakistani army with terrorist organizations do not encourage a fruitful cooperation with the West on counter-terrorism issues. In any event, owning warheads is not the same as using them. Pakistan would need a better reason to use these weapons than a strike on their neighbor on the western border.

   It is probable that Hamas will not attack Israel any more severely than they would under the current circumstances. It is important to note that radical Islamic organizations, and not Hamas, cause the escalation between Gaza and Israel. As of now, Hamas is engaged with their reconciliation agreement with Fatah. A third Intifada is out of the question due to financial and political limitations.

   Hezbollah must pay a lip service to Iran for years of sponsorship, as it did with Syria since the Syrian Spring has begun. It is well remembered that Nasrallah declared Hezbollah would support Bashar al-Assad by hook or by crook. In fact, the assistance Nasrallah has provided to Assad has been minimal. Initially, Hezbollah's activists, who were visible at first in the Syrian arena, are now nowhere to be seen. Furthermore, the recent kidnapping of Lebanese citizens by the Syrian army lead to enough outrage in Lebanon to make Hezbollah unwilling to take part in the coming Syrian civil war.

   What will Hezbollah do if Israel strikes Iran? Is it reasonable to assume that Hezbollah would attack Israel as it did in July 2006? Most likely not.

As in Syria, Hezbollah does not want to destabilize Lebanon, which it can control today. The organization also does not want to actively intervene to support a leader who will step down in the next few months. Moreover, Hezbollah recently served as a mediator in a cabinet crisis, proving its loyalty to all Lebanese citizens.

   Hezbollah would not pay more than lip service to Iran, which is under severe international economic sanctions including blocking government and central bank's assets. Since 1982, Iran has given Hezbollah an annual budget, but in the past few years the size of the payments has decreased and the disbursements were occasionally entirely frozen. Today, Hezbollah cannot depend upon Iranian economic support, and has therefore expanded its illicit drug activity in South America.

    At the end of the day, Hezbollah cannot actually protect Iran from Israel; it can only show its solidarity. However, Hezbollah is not suicidal and would abandon its expression of solidarity if its own survival was at stake. Criticism of Hezbollah after the July 2006 war made it hard for the organization to rehabilitate as it had many opponents. Since then, Hezbollah has chosen to focus on the domestic arena, even at the cost of ignoring the Zionist enemy in the South and turning its back to its patrons. Nasrallah has to prove his people that Hezbollah is an independent entity capable of running Lebanon with a firm hand, for the benefit of all of the Lebanese people.

Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?

   This week, in the highly anticipated Egyptian elections, the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood won 235 of the 498 seats in the lower house of parliament. The Salafist party, Al Nour, won 123 seats.

   These are Sunni Islamist parties, so this new parliament, unlike the past secular houses, will be Islamist-dominated. At the latest, the presidential elections will be held in June 2012, and it is still unclear whether the new political system will be presidential or parliamentary. In the light of the recent success of Islamist parties, the question arises: “Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?”

   Hassan al-Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928 with the goal of peacefully transforming secular Middle Eastern states into Islamic religious states. To this end, the movement established social institutions in Arab states such as schools, mosques, kindergartens and charitable organizations. Its activists were hounded by various Arab rulers since the 1960’s, perhaps because the movement threatened the political and social status quo of these. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia is already a religious state and has still banned the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Saudi Arabia has its Wahhabi version of Sharia law, and Iran has its Shi’a version.

   Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists emerged from secrecy proudly. The Islamist majority in the parliament demonstrates the public’s preference for religious parties over secular ones, and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces may have lost control of the country.

   An Islamic state is not necessarily a bad thing in the eyes of an Arab beholder. A religious state is considered to be less corrupt than a monarchy and more devoted to protecting the interests of the citizens. Indeed, a religious state is seen by many to be an improvement over the past crooked dictatorships. As far as Egyptians are concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood is their social, economic and moral lifeline.

   The problems in Egypt will surface when the religious regime becomes radical. Other religious minorities will be persecuted for their beliefs and the implementation of Sharia law will become stricter, as Saudi Arabia. Egypt might suffer an economic blow as its sizeable tourism sector shrinks due to decreasing numbers of foreign tourists. Many Western travelers would be deterred by restrictions such as modest clothes and prohibition of women in certain public places.

   An increasingly Islamist-dominated Middle East presents several problems for the Western world and Israel. Firstly, a religious regime applies a radically different mindset to decision-making. A national Shura Council would advise the government through Sharia law rather than political rationality. Decisions made in this manner might be detrimental to Western interests in the area.

   Secondly, an Islamic state traditionally singles out Israel and the United States as the great evils of the world. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt denies that it would move to nullify the peace accord with Israel, but it has declared that the accord should be re-examined to see if it harms the country and the Egyptian people. There is a possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood or its Ulamas (religious scholars) would decide to rescind the peace treaty due to religious justifications.

   Finally, even if the Islamic parties won a majority democratically, there is no assurance that they would uphold the democratic system following the election. In fact, the Iranian revolution of 1979 is an example of democratically elected religious parties seizing control and dismantling the very system that brought them to power. A religious majority in the legislature can pass religious laws, even though the new speaker, Saad al-Katatni of the Freedom and Justice party, said that “we want to build a new Egypt, a constitutional, democratic and modern Egypt.”  

   There is no doubt that the Egyptian case is complex and the Muslim Brotherhood movement is standing at a new crossroads. They are not hunted and are in the most powerful positions. Will they leverage their current position in order to promote their Islamic agenda, or will they call for democratization and modernity? If they choose the latter option, it is hard to see how it can be done within the framework of Sharia law.

            
  

Combating Terrorism Financing - A Cultural Approach

   Culture is the language of a nation - its books, poetry and traditions. In order for two nations to engage in a fruitful discussion, it is important for both to understand the other side's culture and moreover, respect it. Samuel Huntington's cultural civilizations cannot communicate with one another because they don't know or try to understand the other's cultural norms.

   

   The importance of cultural perception pertains to states and their strategies to combat terrorism financing. Cultural differences are also present in the nefarious use of charitable organizations by terrorist groups. Muslim terrorist groups ascribe to the concept of Jihad bil-Mal (financial Jihad against the infidels) and therefore justify this misuse. The same principle also gives religious rationalization to the practice of establishing new charitable organizations in order to funnel charitable funds for terrorist purposes such as buying weapons or training of fighters.

   

   All current counter-financing terrorism strategies are geared toward countering money-laundering, and do not prevent terrorists from misusing charitable organizations. Money-laundering counter-strategies cope with the practical matters of terrorist groups funneling money and do not consider any cultural aspects. The existing strategies are not able to address unique cultural elements such as traditional financial systems as Hawala or Islamic banks, which leave no visible paper trail. Therefore, a cultural shift in strategy is needed.

  

   Every strategy that seeks to counter the misuse of charitable organizations by terrorist groups should consider Muslim and Arab cultural norms. The charity in question, Zakat, is one of the five pillars of Islam (in addition to faith- shahada, prayer- salat, annual fasting during the month of Ramadan- sawm, and the once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca- hajj). This is a sacred religious requirement and should be honored by the West. Honor is the key word in Muslim and Arab culture, and every individual's deed is evaluated by the honor it brings to himself, his family, his town or his nation.

   

   The condescending attitude of Western, particularly American, law enforcement agencies creates hostility in Muslim communities regarding the counter-financing terrorism campaign. Consequently, these communities are not willing to cooperate with authorities, the "outsiders."

   

   It is not unlikely that if Muslim communities in Western countries felt appreciated and honored, a fruitful cooperation could emerge to the benefit of both parties. Counter-strategies should focus culturally on charitable organizations rather than financially; the campaign should be Arab-Muslim-oriented, and most essentially, led by Muslim leaders from every country. No success can be achieved without the cooperation of Muslim communities.

   

   A culturally focused strategy might serve as more a deterrent than the currently existing strategies. A successful campaign explaining the disadvantages and consequences of contributing Zakat funds to terrorism could dissuade charitable organizations from cooperate with terrorists. In this way, even when charitable organizations and terrorist groups have proximity to each other (e.g. war zones), charitable organizations might resist the influence of the terrorist group. All this assumes that the charitable organizations are able to choose their own path.

   

   The lack of transparency of Muslim charitable organizations is the biggest obstacle to overcome, and thus an Achilles Heel of any counter-strategy. There are many charitable organizations that have no connection to terrorism. Therefore, it is essential to institute a campaign explaining the importance of transparency, both of the organization and the donor, in order to clear any accusation of connections to terrorist groups.

   

   Some might argue that a culturally oriented campaign for counter- financing terrorism is naïve, but it could help where existing policies have failed. Current strategies cannot prevent the misuse of charitable organizations.

Who knows, it might work.

The Puppet Show

   Only one year ago, on January 12, 2011, a bloc of 11 ministers loyal to Hezbollah toppled Saad Hariri's government. These defections followed a dispute over the U.N.-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The STL was expected to implicate Hezbollah members in Hariri’s assassination, though Hezbollah denies any connection to the assassination. Two weeks after unseating the government, Najib Mikati was approved to premiership by 68 parliament members, a majority of Hezbollah and its March 8 allies.

   

   The March 8 coalition’s backing of Mikati created the perception of him as "Hassan Nasrallah's Marionette" or "Hezbollah's Puppet" in the Lebanese and international media. However, Mikati has proven his independence from those backers several times until he completely disobeyed Nasrallah on the STL issue. What made Mikati cast off the puppet strings?

   

   Firstly, it is important to understand why Nasrallah chose Mikati as his candidate for the premiership. Mikati is an educated Sunni Muslim, who made his fortune in telecommunications. Nasrallah, by contrast, is a radical Shiite leader, who dedicated his life to the destruction of Israel and the welfare of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. Mikati served as Prime Minister for three months in 2005 (following the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami), but Nasrallah has never been directly involved in politics and always prefers to be behind scenes.

   

   The alleged connection between the two is unclear and that is precisely what is so brilliant about Nasrallah's choice. Mikati is considered to be moderate, but expressed a pro-Syrian standpoint and has expressed support for the resistance in the disarmament and STL conflicts.

   

   Thus, when the consultations to form the new government began, Mikati was optimistic and said he insists on forming a government that satisfies all Lebanese citizens. However, the gaps between Nasrallah's demands and the March 14 alliance were too wide, particularly regarding the STL issue. The latter alliance urged him to uphold the STL in the face of calls by Hezbollah and its allies to sever ties with the tribunal. The March 14 bloc also sought Mikati’s public commitment not to disavow the STL, while Hezbollah demanded just the opposite. Mikati refused to make a commitment to any party, stressing that conflicting demands by the rival factions could be solved through dialogue.

   Nonetheless, since May 2011 Nasrallah has implied to the media that American pressure and not internal disagreement is what obstructs Mikati’s government formation. Obviously, the Hezbollah leader was not satisfied with the delayed process and needs to clarify that he is the operator and Mikati the Puppet.

  

   Mikati's response was to emphasize that “the fact that Hezbollah and its allies have 18 seats in the 30-member Cabinet does not mean that the country will join the radical camp in terms of its relations with the international community,” as he announced in the press conference about his government lineup.

   

   In addition, Mikati stressed the significance of more than one-third of the Cabinet ministers having been appointed by himself, the President, and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt, to ensure Hezbollah and its allies could not control the government. This announcement calms international community and addresses the opposition's concerns. It makes Nasrallah look like he is no longer the puppet operator, and paints Mikati as the one in charge.

   

   The main conflict was, and still is, the STL. For a few months Mikati followed Nasrallah's orders by refusing to pay Lebanon's share of funding the STL and by not arresting Hezbollah members accused of involvement in the assassination. However, Mikati agreed in November 2011 to pay Lebanon's share ($36 Million). He did satisfy Nasrallah by saying that Lebanon cannot find the suspects. Nevertheless, agreeing to pay is a severe violation of Nasrallah's trust.

  

   It seems that taking office was the turning point in Mikati's status as a puppet, when realized he cannot renounce his predecessor’s international obligations. Surprisingly, Nasrallah did not react fiercely, and the question remains why. 

  

   Perhaps what most concerns Nasrallah is the future fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the severe economic sanctions on Iran. The latter could harm the major funding Hezbollah receives from Iran.

   

   Only a year ago it looked like Nasrallah could not lose and that his years-long patience had paid off. But the euphoria lasted only a few months – the Syrian spring started, the economic sanctions on Iran became most stringent, and Mikati’s rebelliousness deteriorated. Nasrallah has to find a way to regain control of the Puppet Show, and a war against Israel is not an unlikely possibility. Can a war against Israel be used as an effective solution to his domestic problems as it was in the past? We have to wait and see.  


Data provided by publications in the Lebanese press.

If Assad Falls – The Lebanese Arena

    “Lebanon will begin a process of state building following the collapse of President Bashar Assad’s government.”                                (Samir Geagea, Lebanese Forces leader, to his party members, 1/1/2012).

   Geagea is not alone in hoping that Lebanon’s political reality will change after Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapses. Assad’s fall would have an immense impact on Lebanon even though Syria is no longer considered Hezbollah’s patron-state. Today, Syria is merely a strategic partner of Hezbollah and a channel of transferring weapons from Iran to Lebanon.

   The March 14 bloc dreams of a Lebanon free from Syrian intrusion, with an intact political system. They envision a pro-Western state with no personal or sectarian intrigues. Can this dream come true after Assad’s fall? Sadly, it is probably the only unattainable scenario. Since the 1940’s, long before the Syrians entered Lebanon, the Lebanese political balance of power has been based on the different sects. The Taif Accord of 1989 perpetuated and institutionalized this practice by establishing sectarian requirements for major government positions, i.e. the President must be a Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House is a Shi’a Muslim.

   The March 8 bloc, headed by the Loyalty to the Resistance party (Hezbollah), aims for a different outcome. Edan Landau from Israel Defense argues that Hezbollah might use their influence in the Shiite majority in order to change the constitution. This possibility should not be ignored. However, it must be noted that in the past Hezbollah has chosen not to change the constitution, despite there being a Shiite majority in Lebanon (41%) for many years.

   In light of the changing Sunni Middle East, there seem to be three possible scenarios to consider for a post-Assad Lebanon. The first scenario is the continuance of the current balance of terror - the on-going Hezbollahzation of Lebanon. During the last two decades Lebanese leaders have adjusted to the fact that Hezbollah is the sole Lebanese armed militia, as it and not the LAF was appointed the protector of the Southern border by the Taif Accord.

   Just as Lebanon had its Hezbollahzation process, Hezbollah has gone through a Lebanonization process. Since Nasrallah was appointed as Secretary-General, the Lebanese-Shiite side of the organization has been strongly emphasized. The idea of creating an Islamic State became a utopian ideal of the group while more practical matters dominated the party platform. The Shiite community needed a political and social representation, and hence, in almost every speech, Nasrallah includes the idea of the unity of the Resistance and Lebanon.

   This scenario is very reasonable. It means that Hezbollah remains behind the political scenes and raises its head every now and then to maintain its interests in the government and Lebanon.

   The second scenario is a violent take-over of Lebanon by Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah controls the government as it has major influence over Prime Minister Mikati. In the past, Hezbollah had utilized violent means in order to pursue political goals, such as a veto power in the government (2008). It is not unlikely that the organization would use this strategy again to ensure its political position and power.

   In this case, Hezbollah would take the reins (commit a coup) and appoint its own government with no democratic elections. The consequences of such a coup are countless. Apart from benefiting from governing Lebanon according to its needs, Hezbollah would have to face a new reality as a State-Actor. It would have to fulfill international obligations of previous governments (e.g. the Special Tribunal for Hariri’s Assassination). Moreover, as a State-Actor, the organization could expose itself to international economic sanctions. Today, Hezbollah cannot afford to be exposed to such sanctions, especially when its patron state, Iran, is under the same sanctions itself.

   The third scenario is the worst – the return of the civil war. This is a situation that all parties tried to avoid the last two decades. A civil war would have severe implications: a formation of an emergency government, in which no party can guarantee its control. In addition, the international community might consider military intervention, like in the 1980’s.

   Nonetheless, it is important to remember that an international military intervention is not a trivial undertaking, as we can see from the current discussions about intervention in Syria. Furthermore, the only armed militia in Lebanon today is Hezbollah. Unlike in the 1980’s, no other sect, group or party has an organized armed militia. In this scenario, other sects would have to protect themselves and would form new armed militias to fight Hezbollah.

   No one can predict what would happen in Lebanon the day after Assad’s fall. We can only hope for a better future and a full cooperation with the new Syrian regime.

Sources:

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jan-01/158502-geagea-lebanon-to-begin-state-building-after-assads-fall.ashx#axzz1iCQ8sfQn

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=514&ArticleID=743