Egypt and Iran – the Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship?

   When Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi was invited to the Non-Aligned Summit in Tehran last week, the Iranians were probably dreaming that it would be the a beginning of beautiful friendship. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, no Egyptian leader has visited Iran. They hoped that since President Morsi was the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate for the presidency, the relationships between the two states would change for the better. And the Iranians were heartened when President Morsi accepted their invitation.

   However, President Morsi disappointed the Iranians by again proving himself to be a man who politically fearless. Previously President Morsi has shown his assertiveness when he dismissed Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi and SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) seniors following the terrorist attack in Sinai a few weeks ago. Similarly, he demanded his constitutional rights back with no early warning, when all others thought he gave in to the rule of SCAF. Building on these past actions, his speech in the opening meeting of the Summit was not the warm declaration of solidarity that his hosts had hoped for.

   Iran expected President Morsi to show support with its cause and more hatred against their ‘Zionist’ enemy. Instead, the new Egyptian leader spent the majority of his time speaking passionately about the bloodshed in Syria and the moral obligation of Arab and Muslim nations to stop it as soon as possible. He hardly mentioned Israel.

   After his speech, president Morsi met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Tehran was the first to publish a statement after the meeting, congratulating the “new strategic partnership.” Egyptian officials dismissed the Iranian statement and said that President Morsi discussed only Syrian and Palestinian issues in his meeting with President Ahmadinejad. They asserted that no negotiation regarding a “new strategic partnership” occurred during the meeting.

   Iran was not alone in misinterpreting President Morsi’s intentions. The whole world was watching the new president of Egypt taking his first steps as an independent leader, without SCAF’s direction. President Morsi was given the opportunity to distance himself from SCAF following their unforgivable intelligence failure that led to the terrorist attack in the Sinai desert on August 5, 2012, when 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed while eating their holy Ramadan meal.

   Though taken aback by President Morsi’s actions, Iran needs an ally in these rough times, and Egypt is a good candidate. The Iranian attempt to use the invitation to the Summit as a test for potential allies turned out to be a tremendous failure. The regime cannot acknowledge this failure and tried to paint a rosy picture in their announcement of a strategic partnership. Nonetheless, Iran will not give up on an alliance with Islamic Egypt. The civil war in Syria is just one issue, and Iran’s plans to be the regional leader are ambitious enough that they will not risk it all on Syria. Islamist Morsi, though Sunni and not Shiite, who is the leader of the largest Arab nation in the region, could be a great ally and Iran cannot afford to lose him.

   President Morsi only attended the opening meeting but will be remembered as the man of the Summit. He came to Iran as the leader of Egypt and left as the hope of the region. In central Tehran he called for fierce action against Iran’s closest ally, the Syrian regime, and for support for the Syrian people’s struggle for their freedom.  

   President Morsi doesn’t need Iran as an ally and would do well by his people and country by avoiding a partnership with declining Iran. President Morsi was elected by the people of the revolution, the same people who watch him now trying to convince the Arab nations to stop the bloodbath in Syria. His joining with Iran would send the wrong message to his people.

   President Morsi can flourish and prove himself as a man of deeds for the people of Egypt. Concentrating on Egypt’s economy and internal affairs would be a better use of his time than wading into foreign affairs with Iranian intrigues. With a strong Egypt behind him he might be the leader of the region in the coming years, and determine his own path. Whether it will be good or bad for the Middle East – we have to wait and see.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/30/egyptian-leader-iran-syrian-rebels

http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-s-iran-visit-sparks-controversy

Iran and Hezbollah - Together as One?

   Should we examine Hezbollah separately from Iran, its sponsor state, or should we treat the organization as a strategically integral part of the Shiite state? In order to resolve this dilemma, it is essential to bear in mind Hezbollah’s establishment in the 1980's as both a social services organization and resistance movement.

   From the social standpoint, Iran saw in Hezbollah an opportunity to export the values of its Islamic revolution of 1979 to Lebanon. The Shiite community, which resides predominantly in southern Lebanon, was easy to influence during and following the chaotic civil war. The war left the Shiite community neglected, lacking in social services and impoverished, and the Iranian regime provided spiritual and material inspiration to the nascent Shiite groups. In 1983 the newly formed Hezbollah (“Party of God”) introduced an extensive network of social services funded by Iran, including health services, water distribution, electricity, and even garbage removal. The Lebanese government was unable to provide these services and Hezbollah used these services to build a support base in the Shiite community.

   Today, Hezbollah’s social institutions serve the Shiite community and Lebanese citizens from all religions. Unlike its initial reliance on Iranian funding, Hezbollah has developed diverse global chains of charities, mostly in the U.S. and the U.K., to support their social services in Lebanon.

   Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem often refer to the “resistance society” in their public speeches. Resistance, they say, is a mission and a responsibility for every Shi’a believer in his or her everyday life. According to this outlook, resistance is part militant action, but is also political and social: it is a choice in everyday life.

   From the resistance/militaristic standpoint, Hezbollah was originally made up of recruits from the secular Shiite Amal resistance movement and other revolutionary Shiite groups that were active during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1989). These recruits were gathered by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to create a more radical religious, Shiite, pro-Iranian militia that would safeguard Iran’s interests in the region. Hezbollah adheres to Iran's ideology of the velayat-e faqih (rule by the Islamic jurist) and Tehran had provided approximately $100-$200 million to the organization annually from the organization’s founding until recent economic sanctions.

   Many Western terrorism experts, from Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy to Daniel Byman of Georgetown University agree that for Iran, Hezbollah acting as its proxy army enables to strike Israel and other targets without risking direct confrontation. The organization is also Iran’s proxy in increasing its influence in the Levant.

   Politicians from Israel and the U.S. also jump on this wagon, because it is politically expedient to link these two threats. After all, Hezbollah was created by Iran, and is expected to follow its orders and function without free will. In this approach, the counter-strategy should be focused on the major threat – Iran. Conventional wisdom states that if you cut the head of the monster, the body will cease its activities; a clear-cut solution.

   However, there is another view of Hezbollah, as a creation that has taken on a life, identity and autonomy of its own, albeit with Iran's continued funding and support. The basis of this view, as argued by Lina Khatib of Stanford University, is Hezbollah’s political evolution into a democratically elected party. As a result of the Lebanonization process undergone by the organization over recent years, Hezbollah has eliminated some of its original Iranian influences and Nasrallah has had to repeatedly, publicly state his loyalty to Lebanese leadership.

   Hezbollah of 2012 is not the Hezbollah of the 1980’s. It has a strong political facet in Lebanon and has been in the governing coalition since June 2011. They have been participating in Lebanese national dialogue the last few months to bridge disagreements between political factions to try and stabilize Lebanon. As a pure resistance movement, Hezbollah would not have taken part in such national reconciliation.

   Hezbollah has also strengthened its network of social institutions within Lebanon and established branches all over the world. It has also improved its well-established group of charitable organizations for raising funds, with deep awareness that Iranian funding will not be dependable for long.

   The organization makes its own decisions, but needs to show loyalty to the concept of velayat-e faqih. That is the nature of a religious movement. Middle East politics is what makes everything so complicated. Hezbollah wants to pay respect, but wants to prove its power and strength. For instance, it is convenient for both Hezbollah and Israel, to neglect to mention that much of Hezbollah's weapons arsenal comes from Hezbollah’s wide-ranging arm smuggling network in Africa and not from Syria or Iran. Why? Israel does not want to distract the world's awareness from the Iranian problem, and Hezbollah obviously wants the world to overlook its activities in this part of the world, so this weird collaboration works for both sides.

   I believe that contrary to Nasrallah’s statements, and with the current situation in Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah is first and foremost dedicated to maintaining its position in Lebanon rather than backing Iran. Nonetheless, Hezbollah might attack Israel following an Israeli strike on Iran, but this would not differ from the response of any ally in any military conflict. With no Israeli attack on Iran, Lebanon remains the important part of the equation.        

   The questions we should ask ourselves are as follows, and I open it to discussion with my readers:

- Is the threat posed by Hezbollah sufficiently small to justify attaching it to Iran’s greater threat?

- Has the concrete attachment that Israeli and American security agencies and politicians have created through the years failed us in the war against Hezbollah?

- If so – do we need a shift in strategy to better deal with these two different threats?

For further reading see: Lina Khatib, “Hezbollah's Political Strategy,” Survival 53, no. 2 (April-May 2011)

Hezbollah - Stay Out of Trouble!! (Part 3)

   Let me start by saying: Hezbollah cannot afford for the "powder-keg" of Lebanon to explode into full-scale civil war. Moreover, Hezbollah cannot afford a war with Israel due to the severe consequences for the organization itself, its supporters, Lebanon and the region.

   Given Hezbollah’s sensitivity to local and regional conflicts, it would be risky for it to try to revive the terrorism myth by perpetrating terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Over the past two decades, the organization has carried the labels of pragmatism and Lebanonization, and acts of extremist violence do nothing but undo this hard work. Of all of Hezbollah’s labels, ’resistance’ was meant to be the most aggressive. The label of ’terrorist group’ shouldn’t have been carried by an organization wanting to be recognized as a legitimized player in national, regional and global games.

   Hezbollah does indeed want to be a part of the Lebanese political system. Nasrallah realizes, and emphasizes that "the alternative to dialogue among rival political leaders is chaos." The dialogue Nasrallah is referring to stands at the same point, more or less, for months – disagreement between the rival March 14 coalition and the March 8 alliance whether Hezbollah should be disarmed. Nasrallah refuses to disarm Hezbollah, but agrees to continue the dialogue in order to find another solution that might satisfy his political rivals.

   Aside from the "white aspect," there is the criminal aspect of the organization. By renewing its terrorist activity, Hezbollah is also risking its global criminal networks. The execution of terrorist activities requires financial resources that Hezbollah does not have at the moment. Currently, Western governments hunt terrorists more aggressively than they do criminals. Hezbollah’s smuggling cell in the Canada., for example, could be charged with terrorism, incapacitating that part of their criminal enterprise.

   Contrary to Hassan Nasrallah’s radical and hateful public statements, he is, in fact, a pragmatic leader of a multi-faced international organization. Although Israeli and American security agencies consider Hezbollah to be as a terrorist organization, it is important to remember that every coin has another side, and in the case of Hezbollah, the coin has four sides. Nasrallah’s every statement has a rationalization, but they all have the same goal – gaining points in Lebanese public opinion and frightening the Israeli public. But Nasrallah is not aiming for war.

   The Middle East, one should note, is a militaristic region, with militaristic countries. Hezbollah is a natural player in the region, and exists primarily to resist the State of Israel.

   Nasrallah's statements are just empty threats. Nasrallah knows it, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati knows it, and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu knows it. And yet, none of these kings and bishops tells the pawns in Israel and Lebanon, who expect another imminent, deadly war. What a shame.     

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Aug-07/183700-nasrallah-alternative-to-dialogue-is-chaos.ashx#ixzz22qmdcLLj 

Hezbollah – Back to Terrorism: Reviving the Myth (Part 2)

   It seems that Hezbollah is at its lowest point in years: networks of senior officials spying for the Mossad and CIA, its telecom devices destroyed by the IDF, millions of dollars of embezzled funds discovered a few months ago by one of the organization’s seniors, and internal disagreements in the organization's leadership – all with wide coverage in the Lebanese and global media.

   Hassan Nasrallah is witness to all and cannot believe this is the same organization he took over in 1992. The powerful, unharmed, secretive and uncorrupt resistance/terrorist organization with fearless, dedicated and disciplined fighters has degenerated to become the opposite – weak, disorganized and permeable. Now Nasrallah has to prove to the world and to his people that he is still in control. For this purpose, militant statements work, but militant actions are even more effective.

   For the sake of this post, the author assumes that Hezbollah was behind the attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria. Nasrallah openly declared after Imad Mughniyah's assassination in 2008 that revenge to the 'Zionists' will come. Since then, American and Israeli security intelligence sources have argued that Hezbollah keeps trying to execute terrorist activities against Israeli targets, but until now, has failed.

   The successful attack in Bulgaria came just in time for Hezbollah, and particularly for Nasrallah. The attack was perpetrated a few hours before Nasrallah's intended speech marking the sixth anniversary of the July 2006 war with Israel. Unfortunately for Nasrallah, another attack occurred earlier that day – the suicide attack in the Syrian Cabinet meeting, which killed Bashar al-Assad's Defense and Interior ministers. In his evening speech, Nasrallah eulogized the dead Syrian ministers and ignored the attack in Bulgaria.

   By simply ignoring the terrorist attack in Bulgaria and Hezbollah's alleged responsibility for it, Nasrallah elevated his position as a leader, and eliminated, at least for the coming period, internal disagreements. In doing so he replaced the failed terrorist/resistance organization label with Hezbollah’s natural label - the terrorism myth. Hezbollah is back to being the fierce organization it used to be.

   Less than a month following the attack, Hezbollah decided to demonstrate its power and terrorist mystique once more. Last Friday night (July 27), when most Israeli families were sitting around the Shabbat dinner table and watching the news, Hezbollah released a short video showing the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006. This video gives Hezbollah major credit with its global and domestic supporters and raises its prestige as a resistance movement.

   At this point, Hezbollah needs to gain strength and improve its reputation, so we can assume that the terrorist attack in Bulgaria and the kidnapping film are just the tip of the iceberg. Hezbollah must have determined that these steps would not start a war with Israel at this point in time, as Israel is distracted by bigger concerns, such as nuclear Iran. On the other hand, the organization came to the same conclusion about potential Israeli response before the kidnapping of the two soldiers in July 2006. And we all know how that ended up.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMDDr1IMXh0&oref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fresults%3Fsearch_query%3Dhezbollah%2Bkidnapped%2Bisraeli%2Bsoldiers%2B2006%26oq%3Dhezbollah%2Bki%26gs_l%3Dyoutube-reduced.1.1.0l2.66276.72550.0.74674.12.9.0.3.3.1.348.1899.1j3j2j3.9.0...0.0...1ac.BbTj6mekFOw&has_verified=1

Hezbollah – Back to Terrorism? (Part 1)

   The horrendous attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria a few days ago (July 18^th, 2012) has yet again raised the discussion of whether Hezbollah is in fact a terrorist organization. The State of Israel and American security agencies argue that it is, and Hezbollah asserts that its connection to terrorism is a myth.

   The attack in Bulgaria can only be classified as a terrorist attack, as it targeted civilians and was conducted in a civilian place. Hezbollah might argue that the attack should be classified as an act of resistance, but this argument would be entirely unreasonable. The common definition of a resistance act is that it must be executed against an occupying force on occupied soil, or on that occupier's soil. To the best of the author’s knowledge, even if the first section of the definition was left open to discussion, Bulgaria has yet to be occupied by Israel.

   A few hours after the attack, Matthew Levitt from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stated that “Hezbollah is the leading suspect, and for good reason… this attack is much alike as the AMIA building attack in Argentina in 1994.” This is what the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu declared minutes after the attack occurred – Hezbollah and Iran were natural and evident suspects because they have repeatedly declared that Israel is their mortal enemy.

   Hezbollah does not have a long history of terrorist attacks like Hamas, but the organization was held responsible (and never claimed responsibility) for some of the deadliest attacks on Americans during the 1980's, such as the bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks, both in Lebanon in 1983. The U.S. Government blacklisted Hezbollah as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, after the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and gave it Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) status in October 2001.

   The Khobar Towers attack, one should note, was the last apparent terrorist attack Hezbollah executed against Western targets. All other attacks were executed against Israeli targets, on Israeli or Lebanese soil. The last terrorist attack Hezbollah executed against Israeli targets, i.e. was held responsible for, was the AMIA building attack in Argentina in 1994, the 18^th anniversary of which was only a few days ago.

   It seemed as the organization had changed through the years and the terrorism tag was left only in the Western beholder's mind, most noticeably in Israelis and Americans. Hezbollah’s leadership called it the terrorist myth. Judith Palmer Harik referred the American approach as “settling old scores with Hezbollah” and the Israeli approach “calling Hezbollah terrorists in order to halt the war of attrition being waged against them.”

   The organization became a legitimate part of the Lebanese municipal and national political system and a provider of wide social institutions to the Shiite community. However, with the generous funding of Iran, Hezbollah concentrated its military efforts in resistance-defined actions against Israel. The party occasionally used a limited amount of political violence against domestic political enemies. It seemed as though Hezbollah's leadership was determined to prove to the world that its terrorism was not more than the myth its enemies created.

   The attack in Bulgaria has blown up all efforts Hezbollah made to be a legitimate organization in the eyes of the world, and proved that the terrorist is not a myth anymore. It is the reality.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/did-hezbollah-do-it

Judith Palmer Harik, The Changing Face of Terrorism

The New Face of Egypt?

It has been a difficult week for Egyptians, concluded by Mohammed Morsi being officially declared as their next President. However, the identity of the president and his future plans for the country seem to be irrelevant after the events of the past week.

For the first time in the country's history, Egyptians experienced true democratic elections. Indeed, one must admit, the last two candidates for the presidency were not what the revolutionaries had dreamed of, but this is Democracy and the country gets what the majority votes for. If the citizens don't like the result, it can be changed in the next elections.

To Western eyes, voting for Mohammed Morsi is tantamount to choosing Islam, but this is not necessarily true. Egyptians suffered for decades under the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak – they are poor, unemployed and tired. The Muslim Brotherhood movement symbolizes the opposite of that mentality– they are socially active, they are ‘pure’ from corruption and they are considered to be non-violent and moderate.

The chaos started two days before the elections (June 14^th). The Egyptian Constitutional Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the lower House of Parliament due to the illegality of its elections six months ago, as the Muslim Brotherhood candidates were elected for seats saved for Independent candidates.

A few days later the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled the country after the fall of Mubarak, revealed that it will not hand over full authorities to the next president. President Morsi, therefore, will not be the supreme commander of the armed forces nor the police force. He will not have the authority to control the country’s budget nor to confirm appointment of the Constitutional Court’s new Head Judge. Furthermore, SCAF granted itself the right to dissolve and form another assembly if the parliament-appointed assembly fails to draft a constitution within six months of its formation.

Therefore, President Morsi might change the face of the cabinet, but has little other significance because all meaningful power remains in the hands of SCAF. Moreover, after the Supreme Court dissolved the parliament, Morsi lost his expected political advantage and must start from scratch. With no supportive parliament on his side, a hostile SCAF tying his hands and an angry movement at his back, he begins the first post-Mubarak presidency with high hopes and no tools to fulfill them.

For now, Egypt is celebrating its freedom of speech and democracy. The country is in transition and SCAF’s declaration, though it disturbingly bring to mind the dark days of Mubarak, is understandable due to the current situation in Egypt.

          SCAF, one should not forget, been considered the stabilizing factor in the country following the fall of Mubarak. Unlike other countries that were drawn into civil war after the fall of their dictator, SCAF safeguarded the country from deterioration until the implementation of the democratic elections. Indeed, as SCAF predicted that the choice between these two candidates would lead to enormous popular dissatisfaction; it must have felt the need to act. Is this action temporary or permanent? No one knows. Not even SCAF.

Sources: Egyptian press

The Devil I Know

Is the devil I know better than the devil I don't know? It is with this question in mind that Egyptians will vote this weekend (June 16-17) for their future president. They will choose between Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, and Ahmed Shafiq, the former Prime Minister who served under former President Hosni Mubarak.

The term “nightmare scenario” has been heard frequently over the last few weeks in the international media’s reporting of the upcoming Egyptian elections. But is it a really a “nightmare scenario?” Or is the current reality that the Egyptian public was used to the previous regime but dreamed of another, and now cannot handle the results?

If Ahmed Shafiq, a secular candidate, wins, he might return the country to the old dictatorship which presided over more than 30 years of injustice and corruption. After sacrificing hundreds of lives in the name of freedom from dictatorship, Egyptians expect to have control over their country. However, having Shafiq back in the saddle might not be a bad idea.

It should be noted, that though Ahmed Shafiq was Prime Minister during Hosni Mubarak's presidency, not one of his actions was taken freely. If he is elected for premiership, his voters hope that he will act differently. He might act for the Egyptian people. On the other hand, as old habits die hard, Shafiq might not change his ways. In essence, Shafiq could leave the people of Egypt behind, just as they had been before the revolution began. This is the devil they know.

 Mohammed Morsi, the "religious" candidate, stands in a different, more politically influential starting point in the election because his party, the "Freedom and Justice Party," is the majority party in the parliament (235 seats out of 508). Egypt has never been a theocracy, but does have a deeply-rooted religious-social network of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This network could be used as infrastructure for religious governmental institutions if Morsi wins the elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not considered the most radical Islamist movement in Egypt today. That distinction belongs to the Al-Nour Salafist party, which holds 123 seats in the parliament. The young Egyptians who led the revolution wanted a government without corruption, and increased economic opportunity and welfare for the common citizen. The Muslim Brotherhood shares these goals in addition to their interest in promoting Islam as the cornerstone of society. But the revolutionaries want secular country. They want choice. And they are afraid that if Morsi is the one that is chosen, they would have no choice. This is the devil they don’t know.

Many of the revolutionaries claim they will not vote in this Presidential elections due to lack of revolutionary choices. They are desperate and confused. Their friends gave their lives to make the country they love a better place and they cannot complete their joint mission. Their desperation is understandable.

Yet, these young people have not taken into consideration that the country's wounds are too deep to heal quickly. The country and its citizens need years to recover from these wounds and build a brave democracy free from corruption. A Democracy that will be for the Egyptian people and by the Egyptian people. Maybe then will be the day that the common Egyptian could say that he knows his voice counts.