The New Face of Egypt?

It has been a difficult week for Egyptians, concluded by Mohammed Morsi being officially declared as their next President. However, the identity of the president and his future plans for the country seem to be irrelevant after the events of the past week.

For the first time in the country's history, Egyptians experienced true democratic elections. Indeed, one must admit, the last two candidates for the presidency were not what the revolutionaries had dreamed of, but this is Democracy and the country gets what the majority votes for. If the citizens don't like the result, it can be changed in the next elections.

To Western eyes, voting for Mohammed Morsi is tantamount to choosing Islam, but this is not necessarily true. Egyptians suffered for decades under the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak – they are poor, unemployed and tired. The Muslim Brotherhood movement symbolizes the opposite of that mentality– they are socially active, they are ‘pure’ from corruption and they are considered to be non-violent and moderate.

The chaos started two days before the elections (June 14^th). The Egyptian Constitutional Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the lower House of Parliament due to the illegality of its elections six months ago, as the Muslim Brotherhood candidates were elected for seats saved for Independent candidates.

A few days later the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled the country after the fall of Mubarak, revealed that it will not hand over full authorities to the next president. President Morsi, therefore, will not be the supreme commander of the armed forces nor the police force. He will not have the authority to control the country’s budget nor to confirm appointment of the Constitutional Court’s new Head Judge. Furthermore, SCAF granted itself the right to dissolve and form another assembly if the parliament-appointed assembly fails to draft a constitution within six months of its formation.

Therefore, President Morsi might change the face of the cabinet, but has little other significance because all meaningful power remains in the hands of SCAF. Moreover, after the Supreme Court dissolved the parliament, Morsi lost his expected political advantage and must start from scratch. With no supportive parliament on his side, a hostile SCAF tying his hands and an angry movement at his back, he begins the first post-Mubarak presidency with high hopes and no tools to fulfill them.

For now, Egypt is celebrating its freedom of speech and democracy. The country is in transition and SCAF’s declaration, though it disturbingly bring to mind the dark days of Mubarak, is understandable due to the current situation in Egypt.

          SCAF, one should not forget, been considered the stabilizing factor in the country following the fall of Mubarak. Unlike other countries that were drawn into civil war after the fall of their dictator, SCAF safeguarded the country from deterioration until the implementation of the democratic elections. Indeed, as SCAF predicted that the choice between these two candidates would lead to enormous popular dissatisfaction; it must have felt the need to act. Is this action temporary or permanent? No one knows. Not even SCAF.

Sources: Egyptian press

The Devil I Know

Is the devil I know better than the devil I don't know? It is with this question in mind that Egyptians will vote this weekend (June 16-17) for their future president. They will choose between Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, and Ahmed Shafiq, the former Prime Minister who served under former President Hosni Mubarak.

The term “nightmare scenario” has been heard frequently over the last few weeks in the international media’s reporting of the upcoming Egyptian elections. But is it a really a “nightmare scenario?” Or is the current reality that the Egyptian public was used to the previous regime but dreamed of another, and now cannot handle the results?

If Ahmed Shafiq, a secular candidate, wins, he might return the country to the old dictatorship which presided over more than 30 years of injustice and corruption. After sacrificing hundreds of lives in the name of freedom from dictatorship, Egyptians expect to have control over their country. However, having Shafiq back in the saddle might not be a bad idea.

It should be noted, that though Ahmed Shafiq was Prime Minister during Hosni Mubarak's presidency, not one of his actions was taken freely. If he is elected for premiership, his voters hope that he will act differently. He might act for the Egyptian people. On the other hand, as old habits die hard, Shafiq might not change his ways. In essence, Shafiq could leave the people of Egypt behind, just as they had been before the revolution began. This is the devil they know.

 Mohammed Morsi, the "religious" candidate, stands in a different, more politically influential starting point in the election because his party, the "Freedom and Justice Party," is the majority party in the parliament (235 seats out of 508). Egypt has never been a theocracy, but does have a deeply-rooted religious-social network of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. This network could be used as infrastructure for religious governmental institutions if Morsi wins the elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not considered the most radical Islamist movement in Egypt today. That distinction belongs to the Al-Nour Salafist party, which holds 123 seats in the parliament. The young Egyptians who led the revolution wanted a government without corruption, and increased economic opportunity and welfare for the common citizen. The Muslim Brotherhood shares these goals in addition to their interest in promoting Islam as the cornerstone of society. But the revolutionaries want secular country. They want choice. And they are afraid that if Morsi is the one that is chosen, they would have no choice. This is the devil they don’t know.

Many of the revolutionaries claim they will not vote in this Presidential elections due to lack of revolutionary choices. They are desperate and confused. Their friends gave their lives to make the country they love a better place and they cannot complete their joint mission. Their desperation is understandable.

Yet, these young people have not taken into consideration that the country's wounds are too deep to heal quickly. The country and its citizens need years to recover from these wounds and build a brave democracy free from corruption. A Democracy that will be for the Egyptian people and by the Egyptian people. Maybe then will be the day that the common Egyptian could say that he knows his voice counts.

I'm Here, I'm Here!!

On Friday, May 11^th, Hassan Nasrallah publically referred to Hezbollah’s ability to launch long-range missiles at Tel Aviv. This announcement took place during a ceremony that celebrated the completion of the 5-year “Waad” project to rebuild the Beirut Southern Suburbs. The project was launched by the Jihad al-Binaa Organization after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, and has been funded by Iran. For Nasrallah, these types of statements are neither surprising, nor new. Nasrallah feels left out.

Governments in the region and around the world are currently facing a variety of challenges: bloodshed in Syria, economic sanctions on Iran, a potential Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and economic crises in Europe. No one remembers Hezbollah, once a powerful and influential figure, who threatened and destabilized the Levant.

Indeed, in the last few months Nasrallah announced that in the case of an Israeli attack on Iran, Hezbollah will reciprocally attack Israel. Also, Nasrallah has lately stated that his organization will stand next to President Bashar al-Assad if there is a Western attack on Syria. However, as Nasrallah has done nothing to execute his threats, these statements seem to be an empty shell.

Unfortunately for Nasrallah, it seems that just as governments ignore Hezbollah, so does the Israeli media. Historically the media has terrified the Israeli public with reports of the organization, but it seems that those same outlets have forgotten Hezbollah and what it is capable of. The Israeli media is fixated on the Iranian threat, and barely mentions Hezbollah. No one looks to the Northern border and not all remember the 2006 damages Hezbollah had caused.

It is in this context Nasrallah stressed that

“Lebanon is still in the circle of the “Israeli” threat.” “The resistance that they wanted to destroy increased in its strength and capabilities,” he said, “assuring that “the hand that reconstructed remains on weapons to impose new equations.”

In the Lebanese domestic arena, however, Hezbollah is more relevant than ever. It is one of the most influential parties in Lebanon. Lately, in addition to concern over the spill-over of the Syrian crisis to Tripoli, the hot topic on the table is the electoral law. Brought by the Lebanese Interior Minister, Marwan Charbel, the new electoral law is based on proportional representation and will take effect in the 2013 parliamentary polls. The proposition had sparked controversy among the rival political parties, as the March 14 alliance rejected the proposal, while the March 8 bloc have voiced support for it.

Hezbollah reiterated that proportional representation is the most adequate option, as it reveals and represents the real weight of each party in the country. The Shiite community in Lebanon is estimated to be around 2,500,000 inhabitants, i.e. 60.7% of the population. Passing the proposal in the next few months would assured the victory of Hezbollah and its allies in the next elections.

   

        As always, Hezbollah wants to stay pertinent in the Lebanese arena as well as in regional and international arenas. The path Nasrallah is choosing is one of tempestuous statements against its standard enemies: Israel and the United States. However, these statements have not made the organization seem as fierce as it once was. Hezbollah increasingly looks to be the backup force of Syria and Iran rather than a powerful ethnic militant group.

   

     Nasrallah feels left out. Maybe no one cares anymore. He wants to draw the world's attention and he chooses a childish way of doing so – he shouts the loudest, hoping to get attention. And if that doesn't work, he can always pick a fight. He has the ability to launch long-range missiles at Tel Aviv, you know.

Citation from Hezbollah’s official website:

 http://www.english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=19893&cid=313

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/40486-nasrallah-s-political-aide-urges-govt-to-assume-responsibility-throughout-lebanon

See also: “Lebanon Demographics Profile 2012,” Index Mundi, n.d. available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/lebanon/demographics_profile.html; “Mapping the Global Muslim Population – a Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” PEW Research Center, October 2009, available at:

http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/Muslimpopulation.pdf

Hezbollah's Disarmament and Syrian Spring

   Hezbollah’s disarmament became, and has remained, one of the most controversial topics in Lebanon following the Taif Accords of 1989. The Accord affixed Hezbollah’s status as a “resistance organization,” officially approving its arming and leaving all other militias (e.g. the Christian Falanges) disarmed. From that day on, Hezbollah's disarmament has been a very contentious issue in Lebanon, and has been recently mentioned in speeches by members of the March 14 alliance "support the Syrian resistance”.

   Earlier this week, Lebanese president Michel Sleiman said that in light of the possibility of the Syrian crisis spilling over into Lebanon "we need to discuss ways to benefit from Hezbollah's arms, when to use them and for what purpose." With this statement he clearly supports Hezbollah’s position, which rejects demands for their disarmament as aimed by Israel, and claim they are protecting Lebanon from Israeli aggression. Perhaps this time of upheaval is the opportunity to re-examine whether the Lebanese government should accept Hezbollah’s position and take disarmament off the table.   

   Several scenarios exist regarding Hezbollah keeping its arms, but all hinge upon whether the organization stays with its decision to back President Assad or change its stance by supporting the Syrian revolt. Today, Hezbollah firmly insists that it will continue to support President Assad, although there is no evidence that the organization’s members are currently fighting alongside Syrian soldiers. Recently, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has been encouraging Nasrallah to publicly support the Syrian people, due to claims that President Assad’s days are numbered.

   It is possible that if the fighting in Syria escalates and spills over into Lebanon, Hezbollah would decide to take control of Lebanon violently. The organization’s weapons arsenal is large and the addition of the Syrian army’s weapons arsenal would pave the way to defeat the Lebanese army (LAF) and conquer Lebanon. This scenario, however, seems unlikely to materialize under the present circumstances.

   On the other hand, should Hezbollah decide to support the Syrian people, it is not unlikely that it would cooperate with LAF to keep the Syrian army from breaching Lebanon's borders. Nasrallah has previously stated that Hezbollah and LAF can be merged, and although his intent was to fight against the Zionist State and not Syrian army, it is not an unfeasible option. Nevertheless, it should be noted that though uniting Hezbollah’s and LAF’s arsenals might lead to a substantial military force, it may not be enough to stand against Assad's army.

   Hezbollah stood by and watched the two-day clashes in Tripoli last week between supporters and opponents of Assad's regime. This might symbolize the organization's actual standpoint - staying neutral. As the fighting would spills over into Lebanon, the organization could earn more time to consider its moves. It is possible that Hezbollah would allow blood to be shed by Assad's supporters until it reaches a decision.

   Hezbollah's disarmament would bring significant change into Lebanese political system as well as to the Middle Eastern balance of terror. Hezbollah would lose its deterrent power, and the very necessity of the organization would be in question. Its internal enemies would celebrate their victory on this long-standing controversial issue and its external enemies (Israel and the West) would face a less threatening new reality.

   Though it sounds ridiculous, Hezbollah is a stabilizing factor in the explosive Middle East. The organization preserves the balance of terror between itself and Israel and the West, and has not executed terrorist attacks in these uneasy times (the most recent attacks against Israeli targets were executed by Iranian activists, without Hezbollah's involvement). Today, Hezbollah does no more than paying a lip service to President Assad, and with Nasrallah as a leader, Hezbollah has more pragmatic considerations than fanatic ones.

   Hezbollah's disarmament would lead to a new era in Lebanese history, but would not be a smart move under the present conditions. In the eyes of Lebanese people and their politicians, Lebanon is an easy target to Assad's army and might fall if LAF was left alone to protect its borders.


Sources: Lebanese press

If Israel Strikes Iran...

   Some commentators say that if Israel strikes Iran, Hezbollah will attack Israel to protect its patron state. This assessment could be accurate and there is little doubt that Hezbollah is eagerly looking for an excuse to attack Israel. However, the conclusion that Hezbollah would retaliate on Iran’s behalf is incorrect. This finding only serves to intimidate the public, as well as an Israeli attempt of deterrence.

   There are some analysts who claim that if Israel strikes Iran, Pakistan, Hamas and Hezbollah will attack Israel. An Iranian counter-strike is also a fair possibility. However, a Pakistani retaliatory strike is not a realistic possibility for several reasons. Firstly, though Pakistan has nuclear warheads, it does not possess long-range missiles like Iran does.

   Secondly, Pakistan is more concerned with the ongoing tension between itself and India than with Middle East affairs. Pakistan is also concerned with the presence of American intelligence agencies on its soil (including the bin-Laden assassination, which was executed without Pakistani consent). This preoccupation dwarfs any interest in an Israeli attack on Iran.

   Thirdly, American accusations of the collaboration of the Pakistani army with terrorist organizations do not encourage a fruitful cooperation with the West on counter-terrorism issues. In any event, owning warheads is not the same as using them. Pakistan would need a better reason to use these weapons than a strike on their neighbor on the western border.

   It is probable that Hamas will not attack Israel any more severely than they would under the current circumstances. It is important to note that radical Islamic organizations, and not Hamas, cause the escalation between Gaza and Israel. As of now, Hamas is engaged with their reconciliation agreement with Fatah. A third Intifada is out of the question due to financial and political limitations.

   Hezbollah must pay a lip service to Iran for years of sponsorship, as it did with Syria since the Syrian Spring has begun. It is well remembered that Nasrallah declared Hezbollah would support Bashar al-Assad by hook or by crook. In fact, the assistance Nasrallah has provided to Assad has been minimal. Initially, Hezbollah's activists, who were visible at first in the Syrian arena, are now nowhere to be seen. Furthermore, the recent kidnapping of Lebanese citizens by the Syrian army lead to enough outrage in Lebanon to make Hezbollah unwilling to take part in the coming Syrian civil war.

   What will Hezbollah do if Israel strikes Iran? Is it reasonable to assume that Hezbollah would attack Israel as it did in July 2006? Most likely not.

As in Syria, Hezbollah does not want to destabilize Lebanon, which it can control today. The organization also does not want to actively intervene to support a leader who will step down in the next few months. Moreover, Hezbollah recently served as a mediator in a cabinet crisis, proving its loyalty to all Lebanese citizens.

   Hezbollah would not pay more than lip service to Iran, which is under severe international economic sanctions including blocking government and central bank's assets. Since 1982, Iran has given Hezbollah an annual budget, but in the past few years the size of the payments has decreased and the disbursements were occasionally entirely frozen. Today, Hezbollah cannot depend upon Iranian economic support, and has therefore expanded its illicit drug activity in South America.

    At the end of the day, Hezbollah cannot actually protect Iran from Israel; it can only show its solidarity. However, Hezbollah is not suicidal and would abandon its expression of solidarity if its own survival was at stake. Criticism of Hezbollah after the July 2006 war made it hard for the organization to rehabilitate as it had many opponents. Since then, Hezbollah has chosen to focus on the domestic arena, even at the cost of ignoring the Zionist enemy in the South and turning its back to its patrons. Nasrallah has to prove his people that Hezbollah is an independent entity capable of running Lebanon with a firm hand, for the benefit of all of the Lebanese people.

Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?

   This week, in the highly anticipated Egyptian elections, the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood won 235 of the 498 seats in the lower house of parliament. The Salafist party, Al Nour, won 123 seats.

   These are Sunni Islamist parties, so this new parliament, unlike the past secular houses, will be Islamist-dominated. At the latest, the presidential elections will be held in June 2012, and it is still unclear whether the new political system will be presidential or parliamentary. In the light of the recent success of Islamist parties, the question arises: “Will Egypt become an Islamic state in the future?”

   Hassan al-Bana founded the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 1928 with the goal of peacefully transforming secular Middle Eastern states into Islamic religious states. To this end, the movement established social institutions in Arab states such as schools, mosques, kindergartens and charitable organizations. Its activists were hounded by various Arab rulers since the 1960’s, perhaps because the movement threatened the political and social status quo of these. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia is already a religious state and has still banned the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Saudi Arabia has its Wahhabi version of Sharia law, and Iran has its Shi’a version.

   Following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood activists emerged from secrecy proudly. The Islamist majority in the parliament demonstrates the public’s preference for religious parties over secular ones, and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces may have lost control of the country.

   An Islamic state is not necessarily a bad thing in the eyes of an Arab beholder. A religious state is considered to be less corrupt than a monarchy and more devoted to protecting the interests of the citizens. Indeed, a religious state is seen by many to be an improvement over the past crooked dictatorships. As far as Egyptians are concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood is their social, economic and moral lifeline.

   The problems in Egypt will surface when the religious regime becomes radical. Other religious minorities will be persecuted for their beliefs and the implementation of Sharia law will become stricter, as Saudi Arabia. Egypt might suffer an economic blow as its sizeable tourism sector shrinks due to decreasing numbers of foreign tourists. Many Western travelers would be deterred by restrictions such as modest clothes and prohibition of women in certain public places.

   An increasingly Islamist-dominated Middle East presents several problems for the Western world and Israel. Firstly, a religious regime applies a radically different mindset to decision-making. A national Shura Council would advise the government through Sharia law rather than political rationality. Decisions made in this manner might be detrimental to Western interests in the area.

   Secondly, an Islamic state traditionally singles out Israel and the United States as the great evils of the world. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt denies that it would move to nullify the peace accord with Israel, but it has declared that the accord should be re-examined to see if it harms the country and the Egyptian people. There is a possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood or its Ulamas (religious scholars) would decide to rescind the peace treaty due to religious justifications.

   Finally, even if the Islamic parties won a majority democratically, there is no assurance that they would uphold the democratic system following the election. In fact, the Iranian revolution of 1979 is an example of democratically elected religious parties seizing control and dismantling the very system that brought them to power. A religious majority in the legislature can pass religious laws, even though the new speaker, Saad al-Katatni of the Freedom and Justice party, said that “we want to build a new Egypt, a constitutional, democratic and modern Egypt.”  

   There is no doubt that the Egyptian case is complex and the Muslim Brotherhood movement is standing at a new crossroads. They are not hunted and are in the most powerful positions. Will they leverage their current position in order to promote their Islamic agenda, or will they call for democratization and modernity? If they choose the latter option, it is hard to see how it can be done within the framework of Sharia law.

            
  

Combating Terrorism Financing - A Cultural Approach

   Culture is the language of a nation - its books, poetry and traditions. In order for two nations to engage in a fruitful discussion, it is important for both to understand the other side's culture and moreover, respect it. Samuel Huntington's cultural civilizations cannot communicate with one another because they don't know or try to understand the other's cultural norms.

   

   The importance of cultural perception pertains to states and their strategies to combat terrorism financing. Cultural differences are also present in the nefarious use of charitable organizations by terrorist groups. Muslim terrorist groups ascribe to the concept of Jihad bil-Mal (financial Jihad against the infidels) and therefore justify this misuse. The same principle also gives religious rationalization to the practice of establishing new charitable organizations in order to funnel charitable funds for terrorist purposes such as buying weapons or training of fighters.

   

   All current counter-financing terrorism strategies are geared toward countering money-laundering, and do not prevent terrorists from misusing charitable organizations. Money-laundering counter-strategies cope with the practical matters of terrorist groups funneling money and do not consider any cultural aspects. The existing strategies are not able to address unique cultural elements such as traditional financial systems as Hawala or Islamic banks, which leave no visible paper trail. Therefore, a cultural shift in strategy is needed.

  

   Every strategy that seeks to counter the misuse of charitable organizations by terrorist groups should consider Muslim and Arab cultural norms. The charity in question, Zakat, is one of the five pillars of Islam (in addition to faith- shahada, prayer- salat, annual fasting during the month of Ramadan- sawm, and the once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca- hajj). This is a sacred religious requirement and should be honored by the West. Honor is the key word in Muslim and Arab culture, and every individual's deed is evaluated by the honor it brings to himself, his family, his town or his nation.

   

   The condescending attitude of Western, particularly American, law enforcement agencies creates hostility in Muslim communities regarding the counter-financing terrorism campaign. Consequently, these communities are not willing to cooperate with authorities, the "outsiders."

   

   It is not unlikely that if Muslim communities in Western countries felt appreciated and honored, a fruitful cooperation could emerge to the benefit of both parties. Counter-strategies should focus culturally on charitable organizations rather than financially; the campaign should be Arab-Muslim-oriented, and most essentially, led by Muslim leaders from every country. No success can be achieved without the cooperation of Muslim communities.

   

   A culturally focused strategy might serve as more a deterrent than the currently existing strategies. A successful campaign explaining the disadvantages and consequences of contributing Zakat funds to terrorism could dissuade charitable organizations from cooperate with terrorists. In this way, even when charitable organizations and terrorist groups have proximity to each other (e.g. war zones), charitable organizations might resist the influence of the terrorist group. All this assumes that the charitable organizations are able to choose their own path.

   

   The lack of transparency of Muslim charitable organizations is the biggest obstacle to overcome, and thus an Achilles Heel of any counter-strategy. There are many charitable organizations that have no connection to terrorism. Therefore, it is essential to institute a campaign explaining the importance of transparency, both of the organization and the donor, in order to clear any accusation of connections to terrorist groups.

   

   Some might argue that a culturally oriented campaign for counter- financing terrorism is naïve, but it could help where existing policies have failed. Current strategies cannot prevent the misuse of charitable organizations.

Who knows, it might work.